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WEATHER PERMITTING: INCREMENTALISM,
ANIMUS, AND THE ART OF FORECASTING
MARRIAGE EQUALITY AFTER U.S. V. WINDSOR
JEREMIAH A. HO*
ABSTRACT
Within LGBT rights, the law is abandoning essentialist approaches
toward sexual orientation by incrementally de-regulating restrictions on
identity expression of sexual minorities. Simultaneously, same-sex
marriages are become increasingly recognized on both state and federal
levels. This Article examines the Supreme Court’s recent decision, U.S. v.
Windsor, as the latest example of these parallel journeys. By overturning
DOMA, Windsor normatively revises the previous incrementalist theory
for forecasting marriage equality’s progress studied by William Eskridge,
Kees Waaldijk, and Yuval Merin. Windsor also represents a moment
where the law is abandoning antigay essentialism by using animusfocused jurisprudence for lifting the discrimination against the expression
of certain sexual identities.
If the law is shifting from essentialism while veering closer to
marriage equality, then will these parallel journeys end by reaching a
constructivist approach to sexual identity? Pure constructivism poses
thorny risks for attempts to include orientation as a suspect classification
for heightened scrutiny. As an example, the immutability factor is likely
to resist constructivist ideas that sexual identity is a choice or a construct.
Windsor’s use of animus-focused jurisprudence hints at a solution that
allows the abandoning of essentialism to reach a middle ground because
animus-focused jurisprudence moves the examination away from whether
a trait is protectable under equal protection toward the animus that created
the discrimination within a law itself. This Article explores Windsor’s
animus-focused jurisprudence as the convergence of both marriage
equality and incrementalism, and posits normative reasons for sustaining
this jurisprudence stepping forward.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In early April of 2009, the National Organization of Marriage (NOM) used the
metaphor of an impending storm in its first anti-marriage equality web-video to
characterize the institutional threat that it perceived the extension of marriage rights
to same-sex couples would pose.1 Unlike a mere patch of flowers in May, the effect
of these torrential April showers, as the ad conveyed, would be catastrophic to the
rights of non-gay citizens—more likely flood than floral. Titled “Gathering Storm,”
the video’s message begins with a seemingly-random ensemble of average, everyday
adults standing before a wall of storm clouds amassing together and unfolding
angrily, punctuated with an occasional lightning bolt between one ominous moment
and the next.2 Each member of the ensemble takes turns delivering, with eyes
directly into the camera, lines from the following message: “There’s a storm
gathering. The clouds are dark, and the winds are strong. And I am afraid. Some who
advocate for same-sex marriage have taken the issue far beyond same-sex couples.
They want to bring the issue into my life. My freedom will be taken away.”3 Then
after some further sermonizing, the ad climaxes toward a close-up shot on a young
woman as she utters lines that echo sentiments from the preceding narrative, but this
time with more dramatic urgency: “But some who advocate for same-sex marriage
have not been content with same-sex couples living as they wish. Those advocates
want to change the way I live. I will have no choice. The storm is coming.”4
1

National Organization for Marriage “Gathering Storm” TV Ad, YOUTUBE (Apr. 7,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGi2r-M_gQ8.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.
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Although NOM tries to convey that marriage equality is naturally—like a serious
and encroaching storm—a threat upon the rights of all Americans, a closer reading
of the advertisement reveals that what NOM asserts as natural actually exists as an
ideological construct. Shortly after the advertisement had aired, critics of NOM’s ad
immediately observed the thin smoke-and-mirrors that was NOM’s sturm und drang
over the inevitability of marriage equality. Frank Rich’s New York Times op-ed
famously blasted the message, noting that “[i]f it advances any message, it’s mainly
that homophobic activism is ever more depopulated and isolated as well as braindead.”5 With those sentiments in mind, the soundness of the message’s content is
called substantially into question and the artifice behind the storm reveals itself a bit
more evidently. Further close reading of the ad shows that not only the substance of
the message was artifice, but so are many components of the video that helped stage
the delivery of that message. For instance, the message was not delivered in a more
seemingly-organic narrative—perhaps as a vignette or some other situational
depiction—but rather such delivery was done by speakers directly into the camera,
breaking that proverbial fourth wall in a way that tries to reproduce a documentary
or testimonial style. The testifying ensemble of speakers may seem like a sampling
of everyday people, but in fact they were also constructed purposefully for the ad;
they were carefully chosen actors.6 Even the storm itself—although magnificently
dark and foreboding with ultra-fluorescent snaps of lightning—was a computergenerated effect that swirled indignantly when the message was somber and then
cleared itself up precisely on cue.
In this way, NOM’s attempt to liken same-sex marriage as a displacement of the
status quo becomes suspicious and contrived. What reveals is a construct resembling
the familiar fear-mongering rhetoric that has convincingly subordinated sexual
minorities in the past, in which the dominant political force has attempted to justify
attitudes, policies, and laws that abridge the rights and exclude visibility of sexual
minorities. By posing an us-versus-them dichotomy through lines such as, “But
some who advocate for same-sex marriage have not been content with same-sex
couples living as they wish,” NOM implies that significant enough differences exist
between gays and straights and that such differences are the highlighted reasons for
not permitting same-sex couples to marry while continuing to allow different-sex
couples to do so otherwise.7
This essentialized approach to marginalizing gays is not new. Harnessing socalled principles of existence that seem objectively universal but also terribly
divisive has existed as a way to justify isolating minority groups.8 Differences do
exist naturally between gays and straights, but are such differences appropriate as
justification for the categorical denial of rights to gays versus straights? By playing
up inherent differences that then allows for a split in such treatment, NOM’s

5

Frank Rich, The Bigots’ Last Hurrah, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/04/19/opinion/19Rich.html?_r=3&ref=opinion\&.
6

See Kate Pickert, A Storm Over Gay Marriage, TIME (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.time.
com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1890523,00.html.
7

In this Article, I use the terms “gay,” “homosexual,” and “LGBT” interchangeably.

8

See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
56-58 (2001).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

3

4

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

message succeeds in showing what critical race theorists have long claimed: that
essentialism can be used against a targeted minority group.9
NOM launched the “Gathering Storm” ad at a critical point in the recent marriage
equality debate—just five months after California citizens had passed Proposition 8,
redefining marriage in the state as only between a man and a woman, and within the
same moment states such as Iowa, Vermont, and Maine all moved to legalize samesex marriage within their borders.10 This juncture was crucial as restrictive attitudes
toward marriage equality had started to loosen.11 In this way, the NOM ad was
reactionary and reaffirming—that California might have foreclosed same-sex
marriage in 2008, and yet other states were not quite squelching the issue. But the
failure of essentialism here and the ad’s exposure as construct left its message
hollow in content and NOM paranoid at best. Numerous parodies of the NOM ad
that appeared shortly on the web seem to highlight that paranoia of the “Gathering
Storm” and reveal the absurdity at the crux of NOM’s sentiments against sexual
minorities.12 The only thing skillfully essentialized was animus and artifice.
And yet, the NOM message did harbor a small ray of truth with one line: “Some
who advocate for same-sex marriage have taken the issue far beyond same-sex
couples.”13 In an odd twist of irony, this particular line—whether read within the
context of an anti-marriage equality ad or isolated in its entirety—might be the
single, most accurate statement about the marriage equality movement in that ad.
The marriage equality issue is indeed far beyond same-sex couples; the issue has
decidedly more profound implications—implications that, as Steven Colbert’s
satirical response to the NOM ad precisely underscored, “won’t be solved by
clearing your web browser.”14 Yet here again, NOM obfuscates that idea and uses
the line to set up the “potential storm” that leads to inequality, overlooking that the
implications of marriage equality are less about some threatening intrusion of samesex couples into the lives of heterosexuals, and much more about the fundamental
visibility, inclusion, and acceptance of the gay identity within the terror of
mainstream American existence.
The tension between essentialism and social constructivism has almost always
lurked behind the marriage equality debate, and by extension the movement for gay
rights, as traditionally the differences characterized by sexual orientation—gay or
straight—has been fixed from a biological perspective in order to reach the politics
of marginalization through discourse between nature versus nurture, truth versus
9

Id.

10

See Pickert, supra note 6; see also Timeline: Same-Sex Marriage, CNN: THIS JUST IN
(Oct. 18, 2012, 02:33 PM EST), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/18/timeline-same-sexmarriage/.
11

See Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RESEARCH RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE
PROJECT (June 2013), http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/.
12

See Japhy Grant, The 10 Best Responses to the “Gathering Storm”, QUEERTY (Apr. 20,
2009), http://www.queerty.com/the-best-responses-to-the-gathering-storm-ad-20090420/.
13

See Gathering Storm, supra note 1.

14

The Colbert Report: Episode 542 (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 16, 2009),
available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/224789/april-16-2009/
the-colbert-coalition-s-anti-gay-marriage-ad.
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hypothesis, biology versus choice, us versus them. But recently observable within
the marriage equality movement, the abandonment of essentialism with respect to
sexual orientation has started gaining momentum in the law. Particularly since the
Supreme Court decriminalized consensual same-sex intimacy in Lawrence v.
Texas,15 there has been a progressive undoing of essentialist approaches toward
sexual minorities traceable along the specific legal path to marriage equality
promulgated previously and extensively by William Eskridge,16 Yuval Merin,17 and
Kees Waaldijk.18 In their earlier comparative studies of the rise of marriage equality
internationally, they have acknowledged a few common legal incremental steps that
most societies usually undertake in a genuine road toward marriage equality.19
Conflated together, Eskridge, Merin, and Waadiljk’s theories of incrementalism have
provided a substantial and workable line of decisional behavior indicative of legal
and societal changes toward marriage equality successes in numerous states and
countries. Since their theorizing prior to Lawrence and other recent triumphs for
sexual minorities, the U.S. has brought their independent and collective hypotheses
alive on both federal and state levels to set the stage for accomplishing the extension
of marriage to same-sex couples.
This Article will explore, on the federal level, the notion that the marriage
equality movement in the U.S. has progressed onto the last phase of Eskridge,
Merin, and Waaldijk’s incrementalism. In June 2013, U.S. v. Windsor,20 ushered our
national, social, and legal imaginations into the final stage of marriage equality’s
inevitability. Concurrently, the journey along this particularized incrementalism has
also revealed an observable abandonment of essentialism approaches in the law
toward sexual minorities. This Article examines how the incremental process toward
marriage equality has facilitated that abandonment by tracing the way the law has
dislodged the regulation of identity expression for sexual minorities along each step
of the Eskridge-Merin-Waadiljk incrementalist approach. From there, this Article
will then posit that abandonment’s significance, as it reveals more clearly the
development of animus-focused jurisprudence in order to further the rights of sexual
minorities.
Beyond this Introduction, Part II will recapitulate the theory of incrementalism as
originally proposed by Eskridge, Merin, and Waadijlk, and add to their existing legal
scholarship by adjusting that path to reflect certain significant developments in the
law regarding sexual minorities that have taken place since their earlier works. Part
15

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

16

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS (2002) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE].
17
YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION
PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (2002).

OF

GAY

18
Kees Waaldijk, Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the
Netherlands, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL,
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 437-68 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds.,
2001).
19

See Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 439-40; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16,
at xiii-xiv; see MERIN, supra note 17, at 308-09.
20

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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III will examine the U.S. variation to that theme of incremental change—through
Lawrence v. Texas; the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell; and Windsor—and
determine the journey’s substantial completion on the federal level. Part IV will then
describe how the undoing of essentialist approaches toward sexual minorities within
the U.S. variation has produced the rise of animus-focused jurisprudence and end
with normative considerations on its development post-Windsor. As that
development is achieved, marriage equality should prove less catastrophic than a
storm, but no less resonant.
II. STEP-BY-STEP: THE ESKRIDGE-MERIN-WAALDIJK INCREMENTALISM REVISITED
A. The Original Theory
Comparative studies on the incrementalist path toward marriage equality came
about roughly at the same time during the entrance and adoption of civil unions,
domestic partnerships, and other “marriage-lite” relationships schemes by
legislatures across Western countries and individual U.S. states in the 1990s and
early new millennia. Promulgated by Kees Waaldijk in the Netherlands, and William
Eskridge and Yuval Merin in the U.S., each of their separate studies observed that
marriage equality movements internationally succeeded often through a specific
incremental path propounded by certain sequential changes.21 At the time, these
studies attempted to shed insight into the particular legal transformations that might
eventually forecast the inevitability of same-sex marriage within a country or a state
and also serve normatively as strategies—however gradual—for LGBT rights
activism.22 Calling his interpretation of incrementalism a “law of small change,”
Waaldijk’s study proposed a step-by-step approach to marriage equality through his
substantially historical account of same-sex marriage developments in the
Netherlands.23 Eskridge named his incrementalist theory, “equality practice,”24 and
used it to justify favorably the enactment of civil unions, particularly in Vermont in
1999 with Baker v. State.25 In slight contrast to Waaldijk and Eskridge, Merin’s
position on incrementalism in his study was more heavily focused on its existence as
an activist means to the process of achieving marriage equality, calling
incrementalism a “necessary process,” which relays both descriptive and normative
observations at the same time.26
Although Waaldijk, Eskridge, and Merin each have slightly different takes on
marriage equality incrementalism, their scholarship about marriage equality’s
inevitability latch onto some common recognition of incrementalism as a vital
21
See Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 439-40; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16,
at xiii-xiv; MERIN, supra note 17, at 308-09.
22

Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at xiii;
MERIN, supra note 17, at 327.
23

Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440.

24

ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at xiii.

25

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).

26

MERIN, supra note 17, at 327 (“The necessary process hypothesis is both descriptive
and normative: it reflects how countries have actually moved toward the recognition of samesex partnerships, and it prescribes what has to take place in countries and states that have yet
to provide comprehensive recognition to same-sex couples, such as the United States.”).
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evolutionary staircase that will guide the movement toward that end. The notion of
incrementalism runs deeper than supposing that merely time will change things. That
evolutionary staircase with relatively specific steps escalates to progressively recast
the visibility of sexual minorities upon the wide plain of civil legal rights in a
society. By consensus, Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk all prescribe those steps in the
following sequence: (1) the decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy
occurs first; (2) then anti-discrimination against sexual minorities is furthered; and
(3) lastly, the relationships of same-sex couples are then legally recognized.27 Once a
state has crossed these three steps, the conditions for marriage equality will then be
most evident. Subtle differences in Merin, Waaldijk, and Eskridge’s individual
approaches exist alongside the broader similarities each has expressed in this same,
three-step trajectory. For instance, unlike Eskridge and Merin, Waaldijk emphasizes
that after the first step of decriminalizing sodomy, an adjustment to the age of
consent follows.28 Meanwhile, Merin takes more expressly into account a possibility
of a fourth step in Europe for parenting rights to flourish,29 and Eskridge
idiosyncratically ties equality practice to communitarian and post-modern
implications.30 Otherwise, all three scholars bear very similar incantations of a legal
evolution toward marriage equality. Their differences might be in the variations of
shape or color of the staircase steps, but not in the placement and order of the steps
and in the final destination of same-sex marriage that these steps should reach. For
its remainder, this Article, will refer to their strand of incrementalism
interchangeably as the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory or marriage equality
incrementalism.
But what is more interesting is the broad commonality that Waaldijk, Eskridge,
and Merin have each noted or characterized in between these steps. They each have
observed the positive opportunity incrementalism affords to humanize the
historically unpopular identities of sexual minorities.31 For Waaldijk, who wrote first
about the particular steps that the Netherlands took to recognizing same-sex
marriage, he pegged the process behind incrementalism as not just the recognition of
same-sex marriage but rather “the legal recognition of homosexuality”—even though
he is less forthcoming about the connection between recognition of sexual identity
and same-sex marriage as he is concerned with detailing the three steps the
Netherlands took to conferring marriage rights toward same-sex couples.32 Similarly,
in explaining his “necessary process,” Merin acknowledges that “the fight for gays
for inclusion in the institution of marriage should not be examined as an independent
claim; rather, it should be assessed in light of the status of gay men and lesbians in
Western societies in general and in fields of law other than marriage.”33
27

Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 439-40; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at
xiii-xiv; see MERIN, supra note 17, at 308-09.
28

Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440.

29

MERIN, supra note 17, at 327.

30

See generally ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 159-230.

31

Id. at xiii.

32

See generally Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 437-68.

33

MERIN, supra note 17, at 308.
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Eskridge’s version appears most emotionally illustrative of this connection
between incrementalism that results in marriage equality and societal acceptance of
an undermined sexual identity. Within his “equality practice,” Eskridge dramatizes
what he believes are the effects of incrementalism toward the social recognition of
sexual minorities in tandem with the more immediate goal of furthering same-sex
marriage:
If you are sickened by “homosexuals,” you are unlikely to support gay
marriage, but you might favor sodomy decriminalization for practical
reasons, such as your belief that the state is wasting its time snooping
around people’s bedrooms. Yet sodomy decriminalization and a lessoning
of public condemnation of homosexuality will embolden some of your
gay friends, family members, and coworkers to come out of their closets.
You may be shocked at first, and you can assimilate them as exceptions to
your dislike of homosexuals, but your antigay attitudes may soften as you
enter middle age. Over time, your interaction with gay people might open
you up to acquiescing in antidiscrimination laws, if your experience has
been that gay coworkers are okay and that antigay workers are
troublemakers. You could still oppose same-sex marriage, but even this
attitude might bend when your daughter partners with another woman and
your spouse and other children accept her and integrate her partner into
the extended family. As each step in the progression toward gay equality
encourages more people to be openly gay, not only can middle-aged
homophobic attitudes change, but the attitudes of new generations might
start out less homophobic. These changes will support gay equality.34
Although Eskridge makes large, and at times, nearly tenuous, connective leaps
between the steps of incrementalism in his illustration, the account that he draws is
not impossible—that with each step, both the mainstream perceptions of sexual
minorities and the self-identification of gay people will renegotiate to propitiate
closer to acceptance and equality.35 Indeed Eskridge underlines this transformative
notion by setting up the binary between what he calls, a “politics of recognition” and
a “politics of preservation,” in regards to the mainstream reaction to sexual
minorities as they become more visible within each step of incrementalism while the
larger legal mechanism moves toward same-sex marriage.36 The trip made in
equality practice is from, what he designates, a politics of preservation that retains
the status quo of the institution of marriage to exclude same-sex couples toward a
politics of recognition where sexual minorities have engaged in the process of social
and legal recognition.37 In their respective ways, all three scholars suggest at the
transformation of society’s acceptance and recognition of sexual minorities as the
underlying result of incrementalism while, on the surface, incrementalism pushes
onward to marriage equality.38 In the U.S., this change has been manifested within
34

ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 117.

35

Id. at 115.

36

Id. at 112.

37

Id.

38

See generally Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 437-68; ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE,
supra note 16, at 117; MERIN, supra note 17, at 308.
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the last decade by gradual narratives that led to Windsor and how those narratives
have altered the regulation of the identity expression of sexual minorities. Within the
current U.S. narrative of marriage equality since Lawrence, incrementalism on the
federal level has particularly involved the way that the law has handled the
expression of identity for sexual minorities. Thusly, incrementalism not only
provides the structural stairs for obtaining same-sex marriage, but as we will see, it
also is a mechanism that has started to help strip away the marginalization of sexual
minorities by pushing the law away from antigay essentialist approaches to sexual
minorities. The result of de-marginalization explains why the incremental process
requires certain steps to surpass before even the inevitability of marriage equality is
possible.
B. Dealing with Incrementalist Imprecision
At the time of this writing, it has been more than a decade since the EskridgeMerin-Waaldijk theory came into scholarly view. Since 2002, when Merin and
Eskridge published their works on incrementalism, sexual minorities have triumphed
over a myriad of significant successes and setbacks in the path to gaining equality
rights. For instance, in 2002, Lawrence had not overruled Bowers v. Hardwick39 and
DOMA still restricted the federal definition of marriage for different-sex couples.40
Merin and Eskridge’s respective 2002 studies came out a year before Massachusetts
would usher in same-sex marriage with Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.41
At that same time, Proposition 8 in California would have referred back to a 1982
ballot measure titled Victim’s Bill of Rights that affected the state’s evidentiary code
rather than a ballot measure redefining marriage between a man and a woman in the
state constitution.42 Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell had not yet been repealed, and no support
for same-sex marriage was imminent from the White House; and in fact, before
President Obama would endorse gay rights or marriage equality as goals at his
inaugurations43—not to mention broadcast his support for same-sex marriage on
television44—there was, in contrast, congressional support for the Federal Marriage
Amendment to keep marriage as only for different-sex couples.45 The catalysts that
39

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

40

Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
41

See generally ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16. MERIN, supra note 17;
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
42
See Jeff Brown, Proposition 8: Origins and Impact—A Public Defender’s Perspective,
23 PAC. L.J. 881 (1992).
43

David G. Savage, Inauguration 2013: Obama Hints at Greater Gay Marriage Support,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/21/news/la-pn-inauguration2013-obama-gay-marriage-support-20130121.
44
Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Says Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-says-same-sexmarriage-should-be-legal.html?pagewanted=all.
45
Jonathan Turley, The American Gothic Amendment: Tinkering with the Constitution for
the Wrong Reason, CHI. TRIB. (May 19, 2002), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-0519/news/0205190435_1_same-sex-marriages-marriage-act-marriage-matters.
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prodded the Hollingsworth and Windsor cases seemed nascent. In 2002, the
Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory in the U.S. was exactly what the name designates—
a theory. Since then, marriage equality incrementalism has been set into motion in
the U.S. and some of the events above have directly tested that theory while others
have shown their importance peripherally between the incremental steps.
Critical voices have revisited the theory from time to time, mostly fixating on its
tendency to generalize and also for its fit for the U.S. given our system of federalism
where marriage is regulated by the states46 and the way marriage is viewed—often
religiously—by the public.47 Indeed, post-2002, when applied to the marriage
equality movement in the U.S., the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory seemed to be an
imperfect theory—either not taking as much account of the nuances of the marriage
equality movement through our system in which individual states regulate marriage,
or appearing to focus on generalities rather than social conditions specific to the
country or state that might affect the process. In light of recent acceleration in gay
rights activism, the U.S. journey on the incrementalist path has some variation
enough to pose revisions to the theory that account for the criticisms, but not a
wholesale rejection. As discussed infra, such criticisms, though relevant, might have
been premature because with Windsor, the theory’s applicability has actually been
proven quite strongly.
Specifically, step three of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory—originally the
legal recognition of same-sex couples through alternative relationship schemes, such
as civil unions and partnerships—could now be broadened to encompass, not only
those schemes, but also marriage itself, which possibly abridges the steps from three
to two for some journeys. As discussed later, the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory
can embrace its descriptive functions just as it has always done, but it take its
normative functions less narrowly and restrictively. With that stated, the differences
between the U.S. and elsewhere that had once seemed to reject the applicability of
the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk incrementalism on American soil can be reconciled for
a workable prediction of the inevitability of same-sex marriage in the U.S. In this
manner, we can use incrementalism as a helpful guide to assist us in reaching
marriage equality in fifty states, rather than using it as a mandated road that must be
taken with exacting ritual.
C. The Spirit Versus Letter Approach
At its core, disjointed incrementalism—the broader process theory mechanism
that houses the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory—assumes bounded rationality.
Although it harbors long-term historical ties to Burkean notions of tradition and
societal change,48 incrementalism as a recent economic, political science and policy
46
Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal
Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 135 (2010).
47

M. V. Lee Badgett, Predicting Partnership Rights: Applying the European Experience
in the United States, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 71, 84-85 (2005).
48

See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Marriage as Monopoly: History, Tradition, Incrementalism,
and the Marriage/Civil Union Distinction, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1408 (2009) (“Still another
explanation for the history and tradition proffer might be an underlying commitment to a
Burkean-style incrementalism, with the view that the risks associated with sharply altering
tradition may outweigh the benefits of change.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Cass R.
Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006).
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decision-making theory is most closely linked to Yale economist, Charles Lindblom
and his examinations on the process of gradual social changes that deviate minimally
from status quo and how this type of transformation is more realistic than “synoptic”
changes in which grand units of decision-making are accomplished in gestures that
resemble “one fell swoop.”49 Incrementalism denotes gradual changes as more
realistic, noting that “[w]hen a man sets out to solve a problem, he embarks on a
course of mental activity more circuitous, more complex, more subtle, and perhaps
more idiosyncratic than he perceives it”50 and that once “he is aware of some of the
grosser aspects of his problem solving . . . he will often have only the feeblest insight
into how his mind finds, creates, dredges up—which of these he does not know—a
new idea.”51 In this way, Lindblom characterizes incrementalism as the product of
bounded rationality: “Dodging in and out of the unconscious, moving back and forth
from concrete to abstract, trying chance here and system there, soaring, jumping,
backtracking, crawling, sometimes freezing on point like a bird dog, [the man]
exploits mental process that are only slowly yielding to observation and systematic
description.”52
Applicable variously outside of the marriage equality movement, incrementalism
has been subsequently “reframed” and summarized by other social science scholars
to exhibit the following basic “stratagems”:53
a.

Limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives,
of which one possible form is simple incremental analysis:
consideration of alternative policies differing only marginally from the
status quo;
Intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the
empirical aspects of the problem—that is, no requirement that values
be specified first with means subsequently found to promote them;
Greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive
goals to be sought;
A sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials;
Analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible
consequences of a considered alternative;
Fragmentation of analytical work to many partisan participants in
policy making, each attending to their piece of the overall problem
domain.54

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

49
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in
the Administrate State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 72 (2010); Sharon
B. Jacobs, Crises, Congress, and Cognitive Biases: A Critical Examination of Food and Drug
Legislation in the United States, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 599, 625-26 (2009).
50

DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY
EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 81 (1963).
51

Id.

52

Id.

OF

DECISION: POLICY

53

Andrew Weiss & Edward Woodhouse, Reframing Incrementalism: A Constructive
Response to the Critics, 25 POL’Y SCI. 255, 256 (1992).
54

Id. In its theoretical distillation, incrementalism—as it has been studied by others in the
social sciences—has been a theory that embraces imperfections. Professors James Krier and
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When applied to the marriage equality movement, the particular Eskridge-MerinWaaldijk theory of incrementalism embodies and exhibits the same kind of
limitations that Lindblom’s theory prescribes. Indeed, at close glance, all of those six
stratagems of Lindblom’s incrementalism appear in Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk’s
more specified incrementalist theory for marriage equality. Without doubt, the term
“incrementalism” was not misappropriated when Waaldijk, Eskridge, and Merin
each used it to identify the possible steps it took for a society to achieve marriage
equality.
For instance, with the first stratagem—the limitations on policy alternatives—the
journey from decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy to initiation of
antidiscrimination policies covering sexual orientation, and finally to legal
recognition of same-sex couples, can be thought of as a journey comprised of limited
alternative policies differing marginally from one status quo to the next. In fact,
when Waaldijk refers to his incrementalist theory as a “law of small change,” he
fashions those small changes recognizing gay rights happening only “ ‘if that change
is either perceived as small’ ”55 or alternatively “ ‘if that change is sufficiently
reduced in impact by some accompanying legislative “small change” that reinforces
the condemnation of homosexuality.’ ”56 Waaldijk cites examples of
decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy in European countries where
decriminalisation of sexual activity between adult men (and women) was
accompanied by the maintenance or introduction of various specifically
homosexual offences, including bans on homosexual activity “in public”
(United Kingdom and Romania), or leading to “public scandal” (Bulgaria,
Romania and formerly Spain), as well as on “proselytism” for it (Austria,
Cyprus and Romania).57
In describing “equality practice,” Eskridge notes that incrementalism “proceeds
by little steps taken in a particular order”58 and that one of the imperfections in the
gay rights movement in the U.S. and elsewhere is that the “law cannot move unless
public opinion moves, but public attitudes can be influenced by changes in the

Mark Brownstein, in writing about pollution control in environmental law, has commented
that the widely-accepted Lindblom model of incrementalism considers “practical obstacles”
part of the process of slow change and that “[f]ragmented institutions and segmented problemsolving simply reflect the way reality shapes institutions and procedures. The world cannot be
remade to fit the ambitions of comprehensive rationality; useful decision theory has to be
tailored to the ugly imperfections of the real world.” James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On
Integrated Pollution Control, 22 ENVTL. L. 119, 126 (1992). Lindblom himself had argued
that humans are incapable of designing perfect systems because human rationality is
inherently limited. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”,19 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 79, 80 (1959). In this way, Lindblom explains that democracies “change their
policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and
bounds.” Id. at 84.
55

Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 441 n.18 (citations omitted).

58

ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at 115.
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law.”59 As such, “[f]or gay rights, the impasse suggested by this paradox can be
ameliorated if the proponents of reform move step by step along a continuum of little
reforms. Step-by-step permits gradual adjustment of antigay mindsets, slowly
empowers gay rights advocates, and can discredit antigay arguments.”60
Consequentially, this path is one that prefers a slow and steady pace.
With the second stratagem that characterizes incrementalist motions as
“intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects
of the problem,”61 economist Andrew Weiss and political scientist Edward J.
Woodhouse, in defending Lindblom, explain further that this means there often is
“no requirement that values be specified first with means subsequently found to
promote them.”62 This stratagem could be signified by how—although the three
events nearly required by the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory seek the surpassing of
consensual same-sex intimacy laws, of discrimination against sexual minorities, and
of legal recognition of same-sex couples—these events are not necessarily linked
with the overall consequence of marriage equality in mind. Rather, each step can
function—and does function—to achieve the de-marginalization of sexual
minorities, but they are not informed by each other prior to each achievement.
Despite the more nuanced readings of the Lawrence v. Texas majority (including
Justice Scalia’s reading of it as expressed in his dissent) that claim that the Justice
Kennedy’s opinion was a towering moment for the extension of marriage to samesex couples,63 the opinion itself in its then-present effect was narrower—only
pertaining to invalidating laws that criminalized sexual minorities for engaging in
consensual sodomy, and it was not facially evident that Kennedy penned the
majority opinion with the goal of marriage equality; in fact, the majority demarcated
the significance of its ruling by opining that the case “does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.”64 Instead, Kennedy wrote that “the case does involve two
adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual
practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect
for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.”65 Although after the ruling,
in scholarly and activist dissection, Lawrence does bear eventual incremental
significance for the marriage equality movement, Lawrence itself was confined to
existing as a due process case that decriminalized anti-sodomy laws and handed no
precedent on equality of marriage for same-sex couples.66 This kind of self-

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 256.

62

Id.

63

See Stephen Reinhardt, Legal & Political Perspectives on the Battle Over Same-Sex
Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
64

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.

65

Id.
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containment in the increments likely demonstrates why Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk
incrementalism embodies Lindblom’s idea of incrementalism because it does not
explicitly harbor a means-ends momentum each time an increment is about to be
met.
The third stratagem in Lindblom’s incrementalist theory shows that the process
of change harbors “[g]reater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than
positive goals sought.”67 The Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk incrementalism is rife with
this attribute as well. For instance, in his “necessary process,” Merin describes this
preoccupation after framing his incrementalist theory by starting with the
discriminatory subordination of sexual minorities in the U.S. and abroad, both
publicly and covertly.68 As a result, Merin articulates that the incremental process for
sexual minorities to gain recognition of their relationships is an escalation towards
greater tolerance that is embodied in his rendition of the three steps, couched from a
remedial stance more so than an affirmative stance: “The first and basic level is to
remove from the criminal code (if they exist) sanctions against homosexual and
lesbian conduct; the second level is to prohibit discrimination against gay men and
lesbians on the basis sexual orientation.”69 Merin describes both first and second
steps from a perspective of removal and restriction: the law must take away the
roadblocks that will prohibit future subordination of sexual minorities—in either
steps, things must be “removed” or “prohibited” so that the marginalization is
redressed. Only finally in incrementalism’s step three does Merin’s description seem
a bit more positive when he describes that step as “affirmatively recogniz[ing] samesex partnerships as equal to opposite-sex unions for various purposes, beginning
with ‘soft’ rights such as various economic benefits and following that step with
comprehensive recognition of same-sex partnerships.”70
The fourth stratagem involving incrementalism as “[a] sequential of trials, errors,
and revised trials” could be envisioned again by Waaldijk’s description that in his
“law of small changes,” where “each step in this standard sequence is in fact a
sequence in itself.”71 Again, the U.S. example of decriminalization of consensual
66

See Anthony Michael Kreis, Gay Gentrification: Whitewashed Fictions of LGBT
Privilege and the New Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 31 LAW & INEQ. 117, 146-47 (“While
the decisions in both Bowers and Lawrence turned on the issue of a constitutional right to
homosexual sodomy, it is clear from the briefs and oral argument that the Justices were much
more informed (and presumably mindful) of the decision's potential impact on related matters
embedded in family law. Indeed, Justice Kennedy took great care to distance Lawrence from
the fomenting marriage equality debate.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
578 (opining that the majority decision in Lawrence “does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter”).
67

Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 256.

68

MERIN, supra note 17, at 308. Merin notes that “in many countries, including most U.S.
states, gays do not enjoy the protection of antidiscrimination laws,” and that “[n]ot only are
gay men and lesbians not legally protected from discrimination, but, to varying degrees and
depending on the country, the vast majority of the legal systems of the Western world still
covertly discriminate against them.” Id.
69

Id. at 309.

70

Id.

71

Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440.
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same-sex intimacy in Lawrence serves demonstratively. Although the Supreme
Court did not invalidate anti-sodomy laws until 2003 with Lawrence, the entire
process of decriminalization is likely to have involved Bowers v. Hardwick72 nearly
two decades before, with the first Supreme Court litigation over anti-sodomy laws in
Georgia. That first attempt failed to bring about decriminalization of anti-sodomy
laws, and 17 years passed before the issue was again heard at the Supreme Courtlevel.73 In the interim, the Court ruled favorably for gay rights in Romer v. Evans,74
which overturned an amendment to Colorado’s constitution that prohibited any
governmental anti-discriminatory legislation protecting sexual minorities.75 The
Court had invalidated that amendment after an enhanced rational basis analysis
found animus behind the amendment.76 When the issue of anti-sodomy laws circled
back to the Court in Lawrence, Romer was used, in conjunction with Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,77 which had also been ruled upon between
Bowers and Lawrence in order to create a “serious erosion”78 of the “foundations of
Bowers.”79 This nearly two decade span between first and second litigations at the
Supreme Court that resulted eventually with the first step in the Eskridge-MerinWaaldijk incrementalism did not come about through one complete gesture, rather
even a quick glance reveals that this increment resulted from an evolving process of
its own, that redefined the issues that finally brought forth change.80
The fifth noted stratagem of incrementalism reflects how the process contains
“analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible consequences of
a considered alternative.”81 This particular stratagem is mirrored in the way that the
original Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk incrementalist theory all found at the time that the
legal recognition of same-sex relationship—the last step—only included the
possibility of same-sex couples being legally recognized in categories alternative to
marriage, such as civil unions and/or partnerships. Waaldijk’s version of legal
recognition includes only parenting and same-sex partnerships82; while Eskridge
72

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

73

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

74

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

75

Id. at 635-36.

76

See id. at 632-36.

77

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).

78

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.

79

Id.

80

Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 75,
109 (2003) (“That is to say, Romer called into question the premise articulated in that opinion
that the mere fact of majoritarian disapproval of homosexuality is a sufficient warrant for
legislation disadvantaging homosexuals. Even now it seems to me that gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals can more directly claim protections from adverse governmental consideration of
their orientation in employment, family, and housing decisions by invoking Romer.” (citations
omitted)).
81

Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 256.

82

Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440.
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mentions the same about partnerships but also overwhelmingly fits civil unions and
reciprocal beneficiaries into the fray83; and Merin shares broad similarities with
Eskridge by describing his step three as comprising registered partnerships and civil
unions.84 At the time of their original theorizing, when the incidents of marriage
equality internationally was thinner than what it is presently, and the visibility of
sexual minorities and their entitlement to equality had not escalated into
consciousness with the kind of acceptance today, legal recognition of same-sex
couples through partnerships, civil unions, and other forms short of marriage was
likely more tenable compared to the option of actual marriage itself. Though
marriage was itself a possible legal recognition of same-sex couples because it
existed as the ultimate legal recognition of personal relationships, it was likely not as
probable for sexual minorities at the time Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk
promulgated their incrementalist theory. And although the possibility of bypassing
these alternative forms of legally-recognized relationships for marriage itself would
be much more possible if a state had already achieved the second incrementalist
step—antidiscriminatory legislation based on sexual orientation—Eskridge, Merin,
and Waaldijk all chose to exclude it from the list of possible ways of legally
recognizing same-sex couples in order to fulfill this third and last increment of their
theory. And as we will see, such acceleration of LGBT rights and visibility since
then implies changes in this list of alternatives.
Finally, the last stratagem which allows the process to break the “analytical work
to many partisan participants in policy-making, each attending to their piece of the
overall problem domain”85 can be inferred by the complexity and studied in avenue
of ways in which each of the increments could be resolved. For instance,
decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy could be achieved either through
a majoritarian body—which is how Waaldijk has described the way many European
countries did away with their anti-sodomy laws86—or through counter-majoritarian
measures such as in Lawrence, where the Supreme Court overturned the Texas
statute against consensual sodomy.87 Within either situation the partisanship would
exist, even thinly, as the decision to decriminalize becomes part of the decisionmaking. In Lawrence, the ruling to invalidate anti-sodomy laws was a result of a
majority vote on the Court of 6-3 between liberal and conservative justices.88 In the
marriage equality struggle in California, that increment involved judicial review by
the California State Supreme Court in In Re Marriage Cases that rendered same-sex
marriage legal in 2008.89 Then a public ballot measure, Proposition 8, followed that
consequently revoked the future ability of same-sex couples to marry.90 Further
83

ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, supra note 16, at xiv.

84

MERIN, supra note 17, at 333.

85

Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 256.

86

Waaldijk, supra note 18, at 440.

87

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).

88

See id.

89

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).

90

Dan Morain & Jessica Garrison, Gay Marriage Timeline: Focused Beyond Marriage,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-timelinegaymarriage2008nov06,0,496938.story#axzz2onYMEnjD.
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resolution in the courts ensued—this time federal—with a final opinion by the
Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry.91 Each step along the way had its own
actors—from judges to voters to litigants and finally to the panel of Supreme Court
Justices.
The above-demonstration shows that the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk
incrementalism does fit within the signature of Lindblom’s classical theory of
incrementalism. This analysis is not merely helpful in showing that the EskridgeMerin-Waaldijk theory exists as a variant of Lindblom’s examined theory of change,
but it rather observes what kind of studied attributes that such a theory would
evidently hold. In this way, knowing these attributes—or stratagems—allows more
functional critiques of the theory when the three incremental steps are applied to
same-sex marriage in the U.S.—whether the movement is really filled with small
changes, whether it gets us to practice equality, whether some of the steps in the
process are really necessary. Again, because of incrementalism’s implicit
entanglement with bounded rationality, academic defenders of Lindblom, such as
Andrew Weiss and Edward Woodhouse, have noted a general misunderstanding that
arises when others study a particular transformation along an incrementalist path;
they are impatient with it—perhaps by a sheer human incapability to understand the
theory because they overlook bounded rationality:
[T]he misunderstandings arise partly because incrementalism runs against
the grain of fundamental precepts in Western culture. Especially among
students of policy making there remains an excessive faith in the
possibility of conducting politics largely via systematic professional
analysis, and Lindblom’s debunking of this notion may have seemed to
challenge noble aspirations of using government for social justice,
environmental protection, and other progressive purposes.92
These misunderstandings, according to Weiss and Woodhouse specifically, have
often led scholars, who are both critics and supporters of the theory, astray.93 The
tension, as Weiss and Woodhouse seem to imply when they propose to address this
problem with misunderstanding, is with normative uses of the theory, and how
critics of the theory perhaps become too involved with the specific details: “A
possible tack in this direction is to go back to the spirit rather than the letter of
Lindblom’s work, getting away from unproductive debates over secondary issues
like small steps and inviting a reopening of the underlying inquiry.”94 Weiss and
Woodhouse suggest the negotiation between descriptive and normative approaches
of incrementalism generally use the descriptive approach in broad strokes to inform
the normative approach so that one reflects towards the underlying spirit rather than

91

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).

92

Weiss & Woodhouse, supra note 53, at 267.

93

Id. at 267 (“One possibility is simply to say that the critics are wrong and let it go at
that. But the fact that some very good scholars have been put off by one or more aspects of the
concept as they understand it, and the original formulation of incrementalist ideas (particularly
the discussion of small steps) probably contributed to the misunderstanding. As important,
even the advocates are making little progress developing the incrementalist tradition.”).
94

Id. (emphasis added).
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letter of incrementalist movements in order to then pose questions normatively.95 In
this way, their defense about the utility of incrementalism highlights not its
predictive nature of things but what incrementalism can tell us about effective
strategies:
How do individuals, organizations, and societies cope with limits on human
understanding, and how can they do it better as so to improve policy making? If
condemned by lack of time, resources, and cognitive power to proceeding with
inadequate understanding, how can we become better incrementalists or better
strategic thinkers and actors more generally? What strategies, institutions, and
processes would be helpful in promoting the improved use of strategic analysis and
action through social life?96
This kind of study can be gaze appropriately upon the incrementalism
behind marriage equality. Instead of its predictive value about the
inevitability of marriage equality, the normative uses of the EskridgeMerin-Waaldijk incrementalism lies in strategy and choices to make as
the incremental steps has the ability to take us closer and closer to a
common goal. This approach, to look more for the broad strategies rather
than the predictive nature of incrementalism, might assist those
investigating the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory and importing lessons
learned from comparative versions internationally into obtaining marriage
equality in the U.S. Chiefly, this observation about incrementalism would
seem to temper voices critical of the theory, which could place previous
criticisms of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory into question as critics
have highlighted the theory’s predictive nature and rejected the theory
based on such over-reliance on the “letter” of the theory rather than the
“spirit.”97
As Lindblom himself also notes about incrementalism in his original, exegetical
work on the theory in general, the mechanisms in this type of slow change embodies
a certain deceptive flexibility:
The series of analyses and evaluations that typically characterize problem solving
in the field of public policy is not always a tidy series, not always explicitly
identified as a series, not always recognized as a series. Sometimes frames of
reference shift in the course of series, in some cases so much so that new steps take
on the superficial appearance of an entirely new line of problem solving. But this
appearance should not obscure the continuity that often exists below the level of
superficial observation.98
Lindblom seems to suggest that no matter how disjointed or obscure the
particular series of transformative negotiations that embody an increment appears,
95

Id. at 267.

96

Id. at 267-68.

97

See Aloni, supra note 46, at 160 (“More troubling is the suggestion that the process of
achieving legal recognition of same-sex marriage can be definable[.]”); see also Badgett,
supra note 47, at 75 (“Many historians of sexuality note that historical ‘progress’ in tolerance
of homosexuality is not linear. . . . Not surprisingly, the incrementalists offer no clear idea
about how long each incremental step should or will take.”).
98

BRAYBROOKE & LINDBLOM, supra note 50, at 100-01.
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the underlying continuity inhabits a bigger, unifying picture, with unifying themes.
He illustrates this idea about incrementalism with the following example:
[A] shift in congressional attention from income-tax legislation to salestax legislation might reflect a continuing concern and a serial attack on
certain problems of income distribution. Shifts in attention from
controversy over large aircraft carriers versus bombers to a missile
program to public policy on basic research to federal aid to education
should not obscure an underlying continuity of interest in national
security—even though the consideration of federal aid to education
requires attention to many issues other than national security.99
This flexibility inextricably plays into the sequential trial-and-error stratagem
illustrated by the way the Supreme Court decriminalized sodomy—notably trial-anderror first with Bowers, and then success later with Lawrence.100 But flexibility is
also pertinent to marriage equality incrementalism more broadly as it would possibly
allow for revision of the letter—or letters—within the spirit of the Eskridge-MerinWaaldijk theory to reflect idiosyncrasies in the U.S. version and the refinement of
strategies that reflects such idiosyncrasies—not to mention, address its critics.
D. Revising Step Three
With spirit and flexibility noted, one example of using the spirit-versus-letter
approach reconciles the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory with both Erez Aloni’s
major criticism of the theory’s exclusive reliance on civil unions and marriage-like
classifications for step three’s legal recognition of same-sex relationships, and M.V.
Lee Badgett’s criticism that the three steps do not heavily account for the sociopolitical climate of the U.S., but promotes the path in a general, nearly all-too
universalist way.101 Together, however, Aloni and Badgett’s observations can be
conflated in a way that assists in refining marriage equality incrementalism in the
U.S., and reflect the transitioning political climate and the public fervor for same-sex
marriage presently.
When the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory was first observed and disseminated,
the justification for marriage alternatives, such as civil unions and partnerships—
these other forms of recognizing intimate relationships—was progress because it
gave rights to same-sex couples that they had not received before.102 This
justification was important because these types of recognition short of marriage and
99

Id. at 101.

100

Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (“[T]o claim that a right to
[sodomy] is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty’ is at best facetious. . . . Nor are we inclined to take an expansive view of our
authority to discover new fundamental rights embedded in the Due Process Clause.”), with
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See Aloni, supra note 46, at 160; see also Badgett, supra note 47, at 84.
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conferring of rights and benefits previously unavailable to same-sex couples were
necessary for fulfilling the kind of legal recognition of same-sex relationships that
step three required to further the progression eventually toward marriage equality; as
Merin notes, “[b]efore same-sex marriage becomes possible, the final step of the
necessary process must be completed, namely, broad recognition in the form of
registered partnership or civil union[.]”103 At the time, part of this recognition’s
importance as a pre-requisite for marriage equality depended on the changed
perceptions of same-sex couples after obtaining this recognition for their
relationships. Eskridge’s step-by-step approach relies partly on the paradox that the
“law cannot move unless public opinion moves, but public attitudes can be
influenced by changes in the law.”104 From here, Eskridge’s hope with Vermont’s
civil unions—and with civil unions largely—was that “[t]heories of prejudice
suggest how Vermont’s newest move, same-sex unions, will contribute to the
rational and tolerant society of that state in a way that anti-discrimination laws do
not.”105 He acknowledged that “[i]n important respects, the civil union law is
inconsistent with the premises of the liberal state as applied to same-sex couples: it
treats them differently from different-sex couples, and for reasons that are hard to
justify without resort to arguments grounded in state denigration or even
prejudices.”106 However, in an underlying fashion, these alternative types of legal
recognition amount to an avoidance of bigger ills, leading us to a place where
“functionally, the law ameliorates, rather than ratifies, a sexuality caste system.”107
Eskridge’s premise, then, held some truth because prior to these alternative types of
relationships, same-sex couples did not have the legal spotlight upon them in a way
that conferred rights that were closer to the neighborhood of marriage rather than the
neighborhood of invisibility—or worse, the neighborhood of social and legal
contempt.108 With utopian flare, Eskridge noted, in respect to Vermont in 2000, that
the civil union system there “is one where liberal values of rationality, mutual
respect, and tolerance among gay and straight people can flourish.”109
More than a decade has passed, and the question now is whether public opinion
stands similarly today as when Eskridge made his observations about Vermont’s
civil unions. This question shows that Aloni and Badgett are right that comparative
models of marriage equality might not be as helpful for the U.S. as previously
103

MERIN, supra note 17, at 333; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and
the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 31
MCGEORGE L. REV. 641, 655 (2000) [hereinafter Eskridge, Comparative Law] (“Once samesex unions are euphemistically recognized as ‘registered partnerships,’ and modest numbers of
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conceived because the “letter” itself—the details—in step three could be changed to
reflect the transformations on the national imagination and marriage equality
movements since the early 2000s.110 This kind of revisionist enquiry is part of the
flexibility Lindblom and his defenders conceptually prescribed. And the possible
way to reconcile this attribute of incrementalism and the development and
idiosyncrasies of the U.S. in marriage equality is to use them to expand what could
belong in step three’s legal recognition of same-sex couples.
First, since Eskridge and Merin separately wrote about incrementalism in 2002 to
the time of this writing, eighteen states (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington), and the District of Columbia have
extended marriage to same-sex couples.111 As far as idiosyncrasies that distance the
U.S. from other countries, our system of federalism recognizes that marriage in the
U.S. is not directly regulated by the federal government, but by individual states.112
Although Eskridge and Merin do both acknowledge the federal and state players
when they describe the U.S. journey113 and both Aloni and Badgett’s scholarly
criticisms indirectly exhibit the concept of federalism,114 Jane Schacter’s recent
specific emphasis on the states—specifically calling it “patchwork” or “federalist”
incrementalism—draws this notion out that there might be two major categorical
journeys of incrementalism on American soil: one, federally, and the other,
collectively through the patchwork of states, which presumably consist of 50 minijourneys.115 It is not just once that the U.S. has to journey through the three steps of
the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory for marriage equality, but the journey plays out
on the federal level and concurrently through a patchwork of states until that
patchwork is obliterated by all 50 states recognizing same-sex marriage.116 Since
Merin’s work, which was the latest scholarship on incrementalism, the U.S. has been
moving steadily toward positive notions regarding the rights of sexual minorities.
The patchwork of more than one-fourth of the states in the Union recognizing samesex marriages reflects changing attitudes in this fashion. Particularly prescient since
President Obama’s support of marriage equality, the number of political figures and
institutions changing views and backing same-sex couples in receiving marriage
rights has grown quickly—including changes in attitude of politically conservative
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groups and individuals.117 Socially, public opinion has switched from condemning
same-sex marriage to much more support in the last decade.118
In Lindblom’s incrementalism, these changes would suggest significant impact
on the “letters” of marriage equality incrementalism that should fine-tune the journey
in the U.S. to ultimately capture the “spirit” of the incremental shift. In addition, the
existence of same-sex marriage in the “patchwork” states, the visibility of same-sex
couples in those states who are recognized under those laws, and the changing
support for marriage equality could be tipping the balance in the legal recognition of
same-sex relationships toward marriage equality itself directly, rather than marriagelike alternatives first and then marriage equality secondly. This notion might be even
furthered if several of those patchwork states reached marriage equality from antidiscrimination laws that included sexual orientation (step two), and had bypassed
legally recognizing same-sex relationship through civil unions or partnerships (step
three). Indeed, such “outliers,” as Iowa, Minnesota, and New York, in the
patchwork—that did achieve marriage equality rights without crossing the step that
required civil unions or partnerships—and would support the notion that the
inevitability of marriage equality in a particular state might allow for jumping over
civil unions to dash to the marriage alter itself.119 Just as Aloni is right that there are
variations on how to get to same-sex marriage,120 so is this phenomenon playing
right into the revisionist stratagems of Lindblom’s observations generally about
incrementalism.
Secondly, the relevance of civil unions and partnerships have been placed into
question by the potential “separate but equal” stigma of these alternative marriagelike schemes. Douglas NeJaime recently tracked the transition showing how civil
unions, in particular, were once celebrated and then later vilified in the marriage
equality movement.121 At first, “[a]dvocates framed civil unions, which provided
same-sex couples with the state-based rights and benefits of marriage, as a measure
that achieved equality.”122 But even as early as 2003, when litigation over Goodridge
was in full swing, NeJaime describes how pro-gay lawyers in Baker v. State now
involved in Goodridge had the opportunity to “frame the Vermont experience as one

117
Michele Richinick, A Year After Obama’s Gay Marriage “Evolution”, MSNBC (May 9,
2013, 03:24 PM EST), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/05/09/gay-marriage-progress-report-a-yearafter-obamas-evolution/.
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Gary Langer, Poll Tracks Dramatic Rise in Support for Gay Marriage, ABC NEWS
(Mar. 18, 2013, 02:00 PM EST), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/03/poll-tracksdramatic-rise-in-support-for-gay-marriage/.
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that produced inequality and continued discrimination.”123 Then even later in 2006,
with Massachusetts as the only state with marriage equality and New Jersey about to
follow Vermont by installing civil unions, “LGBT rights advocates protested,”124
and deliberately challenged civil union’s relevance by pointing out that civil unions
could easily lead to second-class citizenry.125 NeJaime observed that the LGBT
rights lawyers in Vermont and Massachusetts knew what they were doing when they
advocated for civil unions first and then abandoned it when marriage equality
seemed more salient.126 Their calculating shift hinged upon the rise of marriage
equality in particular over alternative types of marriage-like recognition and
connotes an expiration of the functional significance of civil unions “as a temporary
solution.”127
At the same time, Elizabeth Glazer has posited the gaining complexity with civil
unions in part because such legal recognition of same-sex couples do sustain that
visibility that Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk previously urged as the important, stepthree jumping-off point before marriage equality.128 Glazer writes that civil unions
present an interesting slippage that adds to the same-sex marriage debate,
“highlight[ing] that it is not only the liberty interest of not being forced to assimilate
that is essential for the LGBT rights movement but also the equality interest of not
being treated differently from couples whose members are of different sexes.”129
According to Zachary Kramer, “[t]he point is that the marriage equality movement
needs to keep an open mind when it comes to proposed marriage reforms. Marriage
is a continually evolving social practice, and marriage law evolves alongside it,
sometimes as the catalyst for change, other times in response to a change in social
practice.”130 This kind of negotiation is what incrementalism can afford sequentially.
If there are some states or journeys in the incrementalist path for which marriage
equality is the natural leap from anti-discrimination that includes sexual orientation
and others that approach this journey more thoughtfully about civil unions and find
some relevance for alternative legal recognitions of same-sex couples short of
marriage, then step three in Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory could be enlarged to
include same-sex marriage as another option. Of course, this change would abridge
step three for those states that reach for it, rather than installing an alternative
scheme. Nonetheless, despite the substantial trend of states that customarily follow
the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk path of adopting an alternative scheme first and then
123
Id. at 192 (referencing Brief of Interested Party/Amicus Curiae Gay & Lesbian
Advocates & Defenders at 4–5, Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (No.
09163)).
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fulfilling step three before adopting same-sex marriage, the small minority of outlier
states that bypassed this step and successfully obtained marriage equality (Iowa,
Minnesota, and New York) would support that option as a viable one for future promarriage equality states popping up within the patchwork. This shortcut might
possibly be consistent with the need, relevance, and significance of alternative
relationship recognition when the opinion of same-sex relationships and sexual
minorities have changed since Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk first introduced the
theory. What Eskridge and Merin might have considered a necessary increment,
because of the “newness” of legally recognizing same-sex couples, has now been
weakened due to the positive visibility of same-sex couples in the law since the early
2000s, or the rise of same-sex marriage in individual states since Massachusetts.
Here is where Schacter’s patchwork incrementalism might also have a similar effect
toward remodeling that third step in the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk incrementalism. If
states like Iowa, Minnesota, and New York, that were at step two with some
antidiscrimination laws covering sexual minorities, continue to move toward
marriage equality before adopting civil unions or partnerships, adding marriage
equality into step three—essentially doing away with that last step altogether—
would be a tenable revision of incrementalism, created by its own progress. Here in
lies flexibility.
In sum, to tease out the normative uses of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory,
the key, according to scholars who have defended Lindblom’s incrementalism is to
funnel incrementalism’s general predictive worth toward anticipating what the next
step will be, rather than anticipating when marriage equality will happen. Flexibility
and intelligent trial-and-error exist as attributes of Lindblom’s incremental decision
theory and should prompt adjustment and re-adjustment along the “spirit” of the
marriage equality movement and not its “letters.” In this way, a revision to step three
is suggested to include a “side-step” option for legally recognizing same-sex couples
through marriage itself—thus, for some journeys, collapsing the third original step of
the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory. Doing so would hopefully reconcile critical
concerns over straight-jacketing the U.S. to the letter of Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk
incrementalism and not account for social and political differences that pose
significance.
Lastly, the final descriptive insight that avails itself for normative strategy is
related to this Article’s main premise and the focal discussion in Part III, which is
that the underlying continuity beneath the marriage equality incrementalism the U.S.
has taken federally has all involved de-regulating the expression of sexual identities
as a reflection of how the law has destabilized the traditional use of antigay
essentialism. Particularly with DOMA’s partial invalidation in Windsor, Part IV will
then evaluate this transition normatively for its merit as a strategy posed by the U.S.
variation of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory with the rise of animus-focused
jurisprudence. Such enquiry so far—and those remaining—in this Article has been
conducted within the spirit of Lindblom’s incrementalism with the hopes of striving
to become better incrementalists when it comes to marriage equality’s trajectory in
the U.S.
III. IDENTITY EXPRESSION AND THE FEDERAL JOURNEY OF THE ESKRIDGE-MERINWAALDIJK INCREMENTALISM
The U.S. variation of marriage equality incrementalism, as theorized by
Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk, has moved the law away from an antigay essentialist
approach that has harmed the social visibility of sexual minorities. From Lawrence
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to Windsor, Part III explores why and how the steps that animate the EskridgeMerin-Waaldijk theory have substantially occurred federally.
A. Decriminalization of Same-Sex Intimacy in Lawrence v. Texas
By itself, Lawrence v. Texas imparted much momentum for sexual minorities by
overruling its previous affirmation and tolerance of anti-sodomy laws in Bowers.131
The issue’s high visibility and the Court’s determination to revisit and decriminalize
conduct possibly indicative of a sexual identity have been discussed at length as an
immense event for sexual minorities.132 It was also the clearest indication of reaching
step one in the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory.
However, even as step one, Lawrence was itself too the product of
incrementalism. According to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, what led to the
Court’s post-Bowers enquiry into anti-sodomy laws was a societal evolution of the
sodomy issue toward sexual minorities after 1986, coupled with two important
decisions in privacy and anti-discrimination that came forth during that same time.133
Kennedy noted that “the deficiencies in Bowers became even more apparent in the
years following its announcement”134 and summarized the decline in the number of
states who still criminalized sodomy (from 25 states to the 13 at the time) and how
many of those declining states failed to execute their sodomy statutes by adopting “a
pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private.”135
The two post-Bowers cases Kennedy mentioned were Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,136 and Romer v. Evans.137 Kennedy characterized Casey
131
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See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2004)
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Supreme Court issued a sweeping declaration of constitutional liberty for gay men and
lesbians today, overruling a Texas sodomy law in the broadest possible terms and effectively
apologizing for a contrary 1986 decision that the majority said ‘demeans the lives of
homosexual persons.’”).
133

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003).

134

Id. at 573.

135

Id.

136

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

137

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

25

26

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

as having “confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education,”138 and that Casey’s pronouncement here
for an individual’s autonomy for making such decisions was inconsistent with
Bowers.139 Specifically, under Casey but not Bowers, “[p]ersons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons
do.”140 From Romer, Kennedy imported the spirit of anti-discrimination from that
case’s ruling on Amendment 2 to Colorado’s Constitution, which had broadly
singled out homosexuals and denied them protection under the state’s laws.141
Kennedy in Lawrence was aided by how Romer was unsympathetic under an
enhanced rationality review of a law created by animus toward a particular group.142
Yet, the intersection between privacy and anti-discrimination was not just a facial
justification for the Lawrence Court to raise issue with the Texas sodomy law and
then decriminalize its prohibited conduct. Framing the decision within existing legal
dialogue in private autonomy and anti-discrimination set the opinion up for focusing
on how the criminalization of sexual conduct infringed not just upon the rights of
consenting adults but also how the law restricted the way in which sexual minorities
expressed their identities. This is one of the symbolic reaches of Lawrence.
1. Bowers’ Anti-Gay Essentialism
By dealing with identity expression, Lawrence had to comment on the antigay
essentialism apparent in Bowers. Little difficulty now exists in seeing how Bowers
treated homosexuality as inferior by criminalizing the way the law believed this
particular identity and orientation essentially manifested: through same-sex
intimacy.143 The significance of labeling sex acts comes into focus as Justice White’s
narrowing of the issue in Bowers—which could have focused on sodomy as a
practice generally since the Georgia law did not differentiate between different-sex
and same-sex partners—to “homosexual sodomy” immediately created a
categorization based on biology as “homosexual sodomy” would imply a host of
other sex acts not under scrutiny, including inter alia, “heterosexual sodomy” and, of
course, heterosexual penile-vaginal intercourse.144 This implication drew itself out
138
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in by unmarried monogamous heterosexuals. Other heterosexual acts involving a deviation
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quite early in Bowers when Justice White examined case law dealing with privacy,
marriage, and reproductive rights, and failed to recognize that the rights from such
case law “bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals
to engaged in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case.” 145 White also found “[n]o
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court of
Appeals or by respondent.”146 Biology was at the center of Bowers’ distancing of
homosexual sodomy from other sex acts—or at least White’s nitpicking fixation on
differences and his attempt to isolate, based mainly on arguing that acts between
consenting same-sex parties bore no apparent likeness to acts that were mainstream
or procreative, or acts that were previously the subject of the Court’s preoccupation
in other cases.147 That biological difference was drawn by the catalogue of criminal
anti-sodomy laws and historical references that White conjured to show how
“[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots,”148 and bolster his
characterization of that history of disapproval, and arguably animus.149 From
biology, differentiation, and animus, the Bowers majority then fashioned its position
to marginalize homosexual sodomy and, in turn, upheld the Georgia to regulate sex
in this way.150 That reasoning also led to the reluctance of the Court later in the
opinion “to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause” that would otherwise
recognize homosexual sodomy.151
Bowers, of course, did not stop sexual minorities from engaging in consensual
intimacy. Partly, the desuetude that some states exhibited in non-enforcement
bolsters this assumption.152 However, Bowers rendered a value judgment that then
justified the law to hold “homosexual sodomy”—and perhaps by extension, other
same-sex acts and practices—as naturally criminal.153 The implications for identity
expression and social visibility would be that when sexual minorities would
from the heterosexual, two partner paradigm—including homosexual conduct, promiscuous
conduct, pornographic acts, and fetishes—were placed far lower on the totem pole of
sexualities.” (referencing Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Note for a Radical Theory of the
Politics of Sexuality, in SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 551-60 (William N. Eskridge, Jr.
& Nan D. Hunter eds., 2d ed. 2004))).
145
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“practice” their orientation through sex acts, they would be rendered criminal.
Figuratively, this result was the storm that gathered over sexual minorities for the
next 17 years. The law, under Bowers, could metonymically harness the biological
differences within sex acts between homosexual and heterosexual categories and
then categorize one such group of acts as criminal in order to facilitate such criminal
branding of sexual minorities. That metonymy was problematic as it underscored
narrow assumptions about sodomy practices and sexual orientation that considered
sex acts as nearly accurate indicators of orientation and excluded possibilities of
sexual identity as something perhaps more fluid.154 At its crux, the Court’s reliance
on biology produced an antigay essentialism that attempted to capture the
homosexual who practiced an act that might be indicative of orientation.
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers found the majority’s construence of
“homosexual sodomy” too narrow and problematic.155 In addition to finding that
privacy law would allow sodomy practices to be constitutionally protected,
Blackmun also found that the majority’s narrowing of the issue down to whether a
fundamental right to homosexual sodomy existed ignored how the Georgia law
could have also applied to sodomy between heterosexuals, which underlines the
majority’s attempt to regulate the identity expression of sexual minorities to reflect
disapproval of the group.156 Blackmun’s dissent also combated some of the
biological assumptions that could lead to antigay essentialist approaches and suggest
more debatable fluidity within the definition of sexual identity beyond sex acts than
the majority had let on.157 For instance, the importance of biology was deemphasized and some semblance of construction was built over the majority’s
essentialism when Blackmun wrote that “[d]espite historical views of
homosexuality, it is no longer viewed by mental health professionals as a ‘disease’
or disorder [by the American Psychological Association]. But obviously, neither is it
simply a matter of deliberate personal election. Homosexual orientation may well
form part of the very fiber of an individual’s personality.”158 Whatever that
definition of sexual identity may be—biology or choice, nature versus nurture,
essentialism or construct—it seemed to Blackmun that this fluidity fit centrally into
why a broader view of the Georgia statute was more appropriate than what the
majority utilized because that fluidity manifests in one way in which individuals
define themselves, through intimacy: “The fact that individuals define themselves in
a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggest, in a
Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be ‘right’ ways of conducting those
relationships and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the
freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds.”159 Blackmun opined broadly, applying this observation across orientations,
154
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Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 201.
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Id. at 205.
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Id. at 202 n.2.
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Id. at 205.
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focusing on commonalities and writing, not between “homosexuals” and
“heterosexuals,” but writing about “individuals.”160 Notably and interestingly,
Blackmun challenged the majority’s essentialism by questioning the problematic
criminalization of homosexual sodomy based on a heavy-handed reliance on biology
that, in his view, led to a terse justification for anti-sodomy laws.161 Instead of
biological and essentialist comparisons between homosexual and heterosexual sex,
Blackmun—in a very Millian tone—would have outlawed sex acts based on those
that harmed others over those that would not:
[I]t does seem to me that a court could find simple, analytically sound
distinctions between certain private, consensual sexual conduct, on the
one hand, and adultery and incest (the only two vaguely specific “sexual
crimes” to which the majority points, ante, at 2846), on the other. . . .
Notably, the Court makes no effort to explain why it has chosen to group
private, consensual homosexual activity with adultery and incest rather
than with private, consensual heterosexual activity by unmarried persons
or, indeed, with oral or anal sex within marriage.162
In this way, Blackmun found reason here that the Bowers majority interfered
with an individual’s right to determine one’s identity by artificially (and irrationally)
overemphasizing the biological differences between heterosexual and homosexual
sex.163 And carrying this reasoning with him, Blackmun concluded his dissent with a
160

See id. at 206.

161

See id. at 200 (“[T]he Court’s almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity is
particularly hard to justify in light of the broad language Georgia has used. Unlike the Court,
the Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so
different from other citizens that their lives may be controlled in a way that would not be
tolerated if it limited the choices of those other citizens. . . . [Hardwick]’s claim that [the
Georgia anti-sodomy law] involves an unconstitutional intrusion into his privacy and his right
of intimate association does not depend in any way on his sexual orientation.” (citations
omitted)); see also id. at 202-03 (“I believe that Hardwick has stated a cognizable claim that
[the Georgia anti-sodomy law] interferes with constitutionally protected interests in privacy
and freedom of intimate association. . . . The Court’s cramped reading of the issue before it
makes for a short opinion, but it does little to make for a persuasive one.” (footnotes omitted)).
162
See id. at 209 n.4 (citations omitted). Pamela Karlan, who was the clerk that aided
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers, has acknowledged the possible connection between
Blackmun and John Stuart Mill during the writing of the dissent, through Blackmun’s defense
of H.L.A. Hart’s thesis against governmental interferences with privacy. TINSLEY E.
YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN: THE OUTSIDER JUSTICE 285 (2008).
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See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Only the most willful
blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is ‘a sensitive, key relationship of human
existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality.’ The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their
intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there
may be many ‘right’ ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of
a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of
these intensely personal bonds. . . . The Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to
recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has
refused to recognize is the fundamental interest of all individuals have in controlling the
nature of their intimate associations with others.” (citations omitted)).
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hope toward future change that also leveraged incrementalism. “It took but three
years for the Court to see the error in its analysis in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis,”164 Blackmun wrote, conveying his “hope that here, too, the Court soon will
reconsider its analysis and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose
for themselves how to conduct their intimate relationship poses a far greater threat to
the values most deeply rooted in our Nation’s history than tolerance of
nonconformity could ever do.”165 His hope would have to stretch not three years, as
in Gobitis, but 17.
2. Lawrence
The facts of Lawrence v. Texas involved two men, John Geddes Lawrence and
Tyler Gardner, who were arrested and charged in Houston, Texas after police there
discovered them involved in consensual homosexual conduct that fell within the
definition of “deviate sexual intercourse” under the Texas criminal code.166 They
were both subsequently convicted under the same statute and their convictions were
affirmed on appeal.167 When Lawrence did overturn Bowers in 2003, Justice
Kennedy, in writing for the majority, targeted that interference with the right to
determine one’s identity discussed by Blackmun.168 Although the Court bypassed an
equal protection analysis and foreclosed the possibility of making sexual orientation
a suspect class, the Court’s analysis focused on the substantive rights that resulted in
one way in which the law de-regulated sexual identity.169
Curiously, Lawrence’s use of a liberty analysis does not mean that the opinion
harbored no aspect of equality-based jurisprudence or that the issue lacked overtones
of inequality. In fact, Justice Kennedy observed that “[e]quality of treatment and the
due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter
point advances both interests.”170 Perhaps in order to acknowledge that merit existed
under equal protection, Kennedy seemed to note that the Texas statute had two
layers within its offensiveness—that it both violated some protectable liberty interest
in privacy and that it expressly criminalized conduct only if practiced by members of
the same sex, which is why that law led to unequal treatment of sexual minorities:
“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”171 Some have observed
that Kennedy’s intertwining of privacy interests here with discrimination makes the
164

Id. at 213-14.
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Id.

166

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562563 (2003).
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Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
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Id. at 577.
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Id. at 574-75.
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Id. at 575.
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Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78
U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 300 (2011) (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575).
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liberty claim in Lawrence somewhat equality-based.172 As Kim Forde-Mazrui has
remarked, “[t]he majority’s expressed reason for [invalidating all anti-sodomy laws],
however, was an equality-based concern over discrimination against gay and lesbian
people if gender neutral anti-sodomy laws were permitted.”173
But by focusing primarily on liberty rather than equality, Lawrence reached
further in its scrutiny of the Texas statute because it also allowed the Court to
examine not just who the Texas statute targeted, but also what the statute
regulated.174 Again, because if the Georgia statute at issue in Bowers were to be left
intact but only the Texas statute in Lawrence invalidated, a conclusion could be
drawn that sodomy could be criminalized across orientations, which would have left
undisturbed the potential of criminalizing homosexuality through anti-sodomy laws
that did not expressly single out the sex of those caught in the act. Due process
invalidated the sodomy statute in Texas and allowed the Lawrence Court to more
easily give a uniform comment on anti-sodomy statutes across the board and
decriminalize behavior that could represent a lifestyle based on sexual identity.175
Kennedy exemplified an attribute of this broader focus when he discussed the
similarities of both Bowers and Lawrence, pinpointing not on the narrower technical
differences between the Texas and Georgia statutes where an equal protection
discussion would highlight, but noting broadly the dangers and untenable effects of
both laws to sexual minorities regardless of how they facially targeted the orientation
of alleged offenders:
The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do
no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though,
have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human
conduct, sexual behavior, and in the private of places, the home. The statutes do seek
to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition
in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as
criminals.176
As Kenji Yoshino has noted, the liberty analysis, as opposed to equal protection,
characteristically hones in on the broad similarities amongst points of cultural
pluralism as courts talk about what rights are protectable under due process in order
to carve out an approach to civil rights jurisprudence.177 Justice Kennedy and the
majority’s use of the liberty analysis here plays well into declaring that the
criminalization of homosexual conduct, whether facially or non-facially same-sex
172

Id. at 300.

173

Id. at 301 (“To be precise, the majority in Lawrence relied on substantive due process
grounds, invalidating all antisodomy laws, rather than the equal protection basis of Justice
Sandra day O’Connor’s concurrence, which would have invalidated only antisodomy laws
limited to same-sex participants.” (citations omitted)).
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Id. at 304-05.

175
Id. at 301 (“To be precise, the majority in Lawrence relied on substantive due process
grounds, invalidating all antisodomy laws, rather than the equal protection basis of Justice
Sandra day O’Connor’s concurrence, which would have invalidated only antisodomy laws
limited to same-sex participants.” (citations omitted)).
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Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
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See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 792797 (2011).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

31

32

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

indicative, has the potential of infringing on the private autonomous rights of sexual
minorities: essentially criminalizing the private aspects of their lifestyles, and
abbreviating their identities—and ability to express their identities—in that way.178
Bowers exhibited this result indirectly when the opinion recited that Hardwick was
self-identified as a “practicing homosexual,” which is why he fell within “imminent
danger of arrest” under Georgia law.179 Although Hardwick needed to pronounce
himself as a “practicing homosexual” for standing reasons in the suit, this selfidentification pointed to how the sodomy law promoted categories of “practicing”
and “non-practicing” homosexuals and the demeaning consequence of
criminalization for those homosexuals who “practiced” their own lifestyles and what
it meant to those who felt obliged under the law to choose not to practice. Where
Bowers refused to acknowledge this assumption, the implications in Lawrence drew
this out.
Kennedy’s slightly-indistinct calibration between due process and equal
protection in Lawrence has not lacked criticism. One of the most prominent
assessments pinpointed Kennedy’s failure to clearly articulate whether there was a
fundamental right at issue in this case involving anti-sodomy laws. For example,
Laurence Tribe has argued that in Lawrence, “the Court gave short shrift to the
notion that it was under some obligation to confine its implementation of substantive
due process to the largely mechanical exercise of isolating ‘fundamental rights.’”180
Instead, what the opinion focused on were protectable interests framed within either
privacy or liberty claims or both that resulted in a myriad of scholarly readings.181
Without a more crystallized pronouncement that the arrests of Lawrence and Garner
violated some sort of fundamental right, Lawrence’s articulation that consensual
sodomy laws infringed upon adult private autonomy appeared less stable within that
historical due process framework. This has led to some confusion.182
But this muddled writing might have been deliberate to allow Romer, an equal
protection case, to influence this opinion as Lawrence is replete with notions of antidiscrimination. As we will see in Part IV, though Lawrence is not an equal
protection case, the case also borrowed from Romer by harnessing the outlining of
animus behind the criminalization of sodomy as bolstered by Bowers.
Within the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory, the imprecision of Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Lawrence—albeit sometimes producing significantly dire
178

Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships: On Values, Valuing, and
the Constitution, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 285, 285 (2006) (“While the full ramifications of
Lawrence will not be clear for some time, the decision at the very least suggests that same-sex
relations and relationships, like different-sex relations and relationships, have positive worth,
and that states are not free to stigmatize members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
(LGBT) community.”).
179

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986).

180

Tribe, supra note 132, at 1898.

181

See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 132; see also Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1140 (2004); Randy E. Barnett, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to
Professor Carpenter, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1584 (2005).
182
See Anthony Marroney Noto, Lawrence and the Morality of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
After Lofton, Witt, and Cook: The Law Before and After the Appeal, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT
REV. 155, 157-58 (2010).
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consequences in actual lower court case law for gay litigants—lies in the scope in
which the decision and its decriminalization of sodomy exists alongside subsequent
moments in the gay rights movement. That shortcoming, particularly in the
arguably-stunted reach of Lawrence’s precedent, signaled as just the first step in
marriage equality incrementalism that much work still remained to be done. Despite
some shortcomings, however, Lawrence did offer a significant advance from Bowers
toward expanding and extending the rights of sexual minorities and recognition of
same-sex relationships by targeting the antigay essentialism setup in Bowers and
anti-sodomy laws. And marriage equality was another marker up another step that
now seemed inevitable. Justice Scalia’s Pandora’s box reaction to the Lawrence
majority in his dissent broadcasted this potential when he warned the public not to
believe that the opinion would not end up “dismantl[ing] the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual
and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”183
Prior to Windsor, several notable lower court cases after Lawrence arguably tamed
the bite of Scalia’s remarks when they distinguished themselves from the opinion in
dealing with anti-sodomy laws.184 But the murkiness of the Lawrence opinion, which
led to such distancing in the post-Lawrence cases, highlighted that the goal toward
recognizing same-sex identities was a lengthier tale—entwined between both the
liberty and equality aspects of the Constitution. And Scalia, though on a problematic
side of history, was actually right about Lawrence.
Ultimately within identity expression, the decriminalization of consensual
sodomy in Lawrence is a commentary on sexual identity. As step one in the
Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory, the gesture from Lawrence elevated the worth of
sexual minorities from being potential criminals or restricting their lives based on a
private, otherwise autonomous behavior indicative of sexual orientation. What
decriminalizing consensual sodomy in Lawrence did was recast identities for
subsequent milestones in the marriage equality movement by beginning to remove
the legal stigma traditionally placed upon the gay identity. As we shall see next,
what Lawrence started was then extended by the repeal of the military’s separation
policies against sexual minorities in Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.
B. Anti-discrimination in the Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
If, by decriminalizing consensual sodomy, Lawrence had recast the gay identity
by not allowing certain previously-essentialized expressions of identity to trigger
criminal status, then the 2011 repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (“DADT”)185 added to
183

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

184

See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809
(11th Cir. 2004) (using differences between civil and criminal law systems to distinguish
Lawrence in adoption case); United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 207-08 (Ct. App. A.F.
2004) (finding that senior-subordinate same-sex activity in the military was unlike consensual
sodomy protected under Lawrence); L.A.M. v. B.M., 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. 2004) (finding that
Lawrence would not protect lesbian mother from having her custody arrangement with exhusband modified); State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 234 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (distinguishing
Lawrence in criminal case involving underage same-sex activity).
185

In this Article, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the accompanying acronym DADT refers in
shorthand not only to the Clinton compromise of no longer permitting the military to ask
affirmatively if a servicemember was a sexual minority, but as shorthand to describe the
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Lawrence by not allowing sexual conduct and other expressions to become the basis
for discrimination either—fulfilling the second step in Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk
incrementalism. Lawrence had given efforts to repeal DADT a certain momentum.
Even Antony Barone Kolenc, a critic of the repeal, has noted that
[b]y the time of the 2000 Presidential election, it seemed the battle had been
fought and won for the DADT policy. Storm clouds appeared on the horizon,
however, when in 2003 the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law criminalizing
homosexual conduct in the landmark case Lawrence v. Texas. Justice Anthony
Kennedy penned a decision for the Court that created uncertainty about the
constitutional status of homosexuals as a protected class. Reinvigorated opponents of
DADT saw the possibility for renewed challenges in the courts. 186
Kolenc’s “storm cloud” imagery here characterizing the improvements in gay
rights echoes that NOM’s metaphoric portrayal of the gathering nimbus of same-sex
marriage (nearly as an inciting motif for same-sex marriage opponents).187 In a
negative way, this comparison to a portentous storm does truthfully relay the
resonance that Lawrence possessed.
1. DADT’s Rise
On the more specific level of expressive liberty in the military, the period
between Lawrence’s decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy and the
repeal could be seen as a struggle between post-Lawrence views on sexual
orientation and privacy, and the keenness of courts to defer to the military.
Homosexuality and the U.S. military have always had an interesting history
intertwined with identity expression and social visibility—much like anti-sodomy
laws. From the early twentieth century, the military had established a longstanding
policy of singling out sexual minorities, and like the anti-sodomy laws at issue in
Lawrence and in Bowers, the DADT policy marginalized LGBT identities in the
military through conduct—specifically via express self-referential conduct, conduct
that is sexual and conduct that would otherwise tip off a likelihood of a homosexual
orientation.188 In fact, one contributing historical genesis that fueled the military’s
approach to discrimination was based on the criminalization of consensual sodomy
in the military during the 1920s.189 Once the military criminalized consensual
underlying legislation of separating LGBT servicemembers from the military in which the
Congress enacted in 1993. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed).
186

Antony Barone Kolenc, Pretend to Defend: Executive Duty and the Demise of “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell”,48 GONZ. L. REV. 107, 112 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
187

See Gathering Storm, supra note 1.

188

Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Sexual Identity as Personhood: Towards an Expressive Liberty
in the Military Context, 84 N.D. L. REV. 175, 195 (2008) (“Don't Ask, Don't Tell also
functionally replicates sodomy laws within the military context in that it criminalizes samesex intimacy. Pre-Lawrence sodomy laws did, like Don't Ask, Don't Tell, contain a message of
societal disapproval of homosexual intimacy.”).
189
Fred L. Borch III, The History of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the Army: How We Got to
It and Why It Is What It Is, 203 MIL. L. REV. 189, 190 (2010) (“History shows that the Army
did not have much official interest in homosexuals and homosexual conduct until the 1920s,
when consensual sodomy was criminalized for the first time in the AW [(Articles of War)],
and the Army began administratively discharging gay Soldiers regardless of conduct.”
(footnotes omitted)).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/4

34

2014]

WEATHER PERMITTING

35

sodomy, a transference took place from criminalization of conduct that could
externalize the identity of sexual minorities to actual exclusion of those who were
homosexual, on the basis that homosexuality was an illness.190 At the time,
homosexuality as pathology was a prevalent subscription, and in the military, this
notion became a pretext that homosexuals were individuals who were “ill” and could
not then serve in the military because that illness placed “afflicted” individuals
below the mandated standards of health and well-being.191 Again, biology was
placed behind the differentiation—with same-sex attraction now classified as a
sickness. Once the American Psychological Association abandoned the notion of
homosexuality as pathology in 1973, the military switched its reason for
discriminating against homosexuals from illness to another essentialized heteronormative sentiment that homosexuality was just not compatible in the armed forces,
specifically a threat to unit cohesion.192 But the continuation of sexual minorities
serving in the military prompted the Clinton administration in 1993 to consider an
executive order to lift the discrimination; before that happened, Congress passed
legislation, essentially DADT, that met Clinton halfway—not banning sexual
minority from service outright, just banning the openness of the perceived identity
expression and existence of sexual minorities.193 In this legislation, expressions of
LGBT identities in the military would have prompted investigation and possible
separation from service.194 Expressions included conduct that would indicate selfidentification with the gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgendered identity—i.e. sexual
behavior indicative of the lifestyle—or a self-identifying pronouncement—i.e.
someone uttering the words, “I am gay.”195
190

Id. at 193 (“Shortly after the Congress criminalized consensual sodomy in the military,
the Army also began using its medical regulations to bar gay men from enlisting. . . . This was
a remarkable historical shift in the sense that homosexuality was now viewed—at least by the
Army—as an illness rather than a sin or a crime.”) (footnotes omitted).
191

Id. (noting that “[t]he presence of gays in the Army could not be tolerated because, as a
1923 Medical Department regulation stated, homosexuality was ‘sexual psychopathy,’ and, as
sexual deviants, homosexuals were unfit for military service” (footnotes omitted)).
192

See id. at 199-200 (“Empirical research by psychologists and psychiatrists, changing
societal views on the morality of sexual behavior, and the rise of a politically active GLBT
community caused the American Psychiatric Association to declassify homosexuality as a
mental disorder and removed it from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) II (2nd edition) in 1973. Some psychiatrists and psychoanalysts opposed to
the declassification of homosexuality as a mental illness forced the Association's membership
to vote on the issue the following year, but their view was rejected. As a result, by the late1970s the prevailing view in the medical community was that gays and lesbians were not
sexual deviants and that there was no medical basis to exclude them from the Army. While the
Army had long abandoned any claim that it was excluding gays and lesbians from its ranks for
medical reasons, the lack of any credible medical support for discrimination against
homosexuals in uniform meant that the Army now relied completely on good order and
discipline as a rationale.” (footnotes omitted)).
193

Mark Thompson, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Turns 15, TIME (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1707545,00.html.
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See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006) (repealed).
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Once sexual minorities were allowed to serve in the military, the discriminatory
effect of the policy shifted from one of excluding sexual minorities to regulating
how such identities were expressed. This shift affected how identity expression
became more narrowly the isolated target of military separation actions. Again, this
result of regulating identity expression had antigay essentialist roots. The DADT
policy, up until its repeal, hindered the expression of identity by pressuring LGBT
military members to hide their identities as sexual minorities if they intended to
serve in the military.196 With the inclusion of these “silenced” homosexuals in the
military, the continued justification to discriminate based on how sexual minorities
would disrupt unit cohesion took on an even more nuanced layer as the policy now
seemed to say it would not just be the homosexual who would disrupt unit cohesion,
just the one who “practiced” or “flaunted” his or her homosexuality who would.197
And ultimately, all of this rejection and reaction by the military was externally
manifested by the regulation of conduct including the practice of consensual sodomy
and sexual practices possibly indicative of LGBT identities, but difficult and
problematic to link to the breaking of unit cohesion, which made the justification a
pretense.
By regulating identity expression, DADT’s preference for the silent homosexual
over the openly-practicing homosexual implied several important things. First,
hetero-normative traits were favored over perceived “homosexual” traits, which
created a “compulsory heterosexuality.”198 This implication, in turn, suggested
secondarily that hetero-normative traits in this sense could be “performed.”199 If
DADT worked within a compulsion and presumption of heterosexuality, the hidden
encouragement for a LGBT servicemember would not just be to keep silent about his
or her sexual identity but to play into that heterosexual presumption because doing
so would decrease potential of detection. The observation that gays in the military
had to pass as straight if they wanted to avoid being persecuted is not novel by
196
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S.
Military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1192-93 (1997) (“By
forbidding expressions of gay identity in any form, at any time, and with any individual—
including a servicemember’s family and friends—the policy compels servicemembers
constantly and affirmatively to express a sexual identity of the military’s choosing. . . . Since
sexual orientation was made a matter of active concern in the military while the new policy
was being debated, they have suggested, servicemembers are now more anxious to proclaim
their heterosexuality loudly—and to put pressure on those around them to do the same—than
they were under the blanket exclusion. Whether or not this observation holds true as a general
proposition, it remains the case that the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy capitalizes upon the
heterosexual presumption to enforce a direct regulation of the sexual identities of gay and
lesbian servicemembers.” (footnotes omitted)).
197

Id.

198

Id. at 1158 (“Whether gay and lesbian servicemembers must affirm a heterosexual
identity in words—as, frequently, they must—or whether their enforced silence is loud
enough to claim the “default characterization” of heterosexual identity that most conversations
offer, the background of social relations in the military, as in most other contexts, is one of
presumptive, compulsory heterosexuality.” (footnote omitted)).
199
See id. at 1192 (“Similarly, although the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy contemplates that
gay people will serve among the ranks of the armed forces, it relies upon the ideological
imperative of the heterosexual presumption to place its brand upon them.”).
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DADT standards, nor new prior to DADT. But DADT’s explicitness raised
questions of performativity: that to remain safe from possible military inquiry and
separation, a LGBT member must marginalize self-identification in order to perform
or pass under mainstream hetero-normative scrutiny. This demand not only reflected
an implication that self-expression more indicative of a LGBT identity was plainly
undesirable but that hetero-normative traits are linked more closely to perceived
essentialist assumptions of how a “good” soldier behaves or what characteristics a
“good” soldier should embody.200 This discriminatory aspect becomes clearer when
we see that, under DADT, only the “non-practicing,” “straight-acting,” and closeted
LGBT servicemember would have prevailed (but of course, at great costs to his or
her own identity expression) while non-gay servicemembers could talk about their
relationships and romantic lives without persecution.201 This shows how the
disapproval of sexual identities other than hetero-normative ones relegated LGBT
servicemembers into a position of having to play safe.
2. Challenging Essentialism and Deference
Cases challenging DADT prior to Lawrence were, for the most part, abysmally
unsuccessful to overcoming judicial deference to the military for adhering to unit
cohesion and to other reasons open homosexuality was purportedly a threat.202 Post200

See Suzanna Danuta Walters, The Few, the Proud, the Gays: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and
the Trap of Tolerance, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 87, 109-10 (2011) (“The arguments
against gays in the military not only claim gays will disrupt unit morale and effectiveness (by
their very difference, their free-floating and unmoored desires, their effeminate or-alternatelytheir manly nature), but also claim they are not ‘fit for service.’ Underlying both these
objections is an argument about performance: gays cannot perform soldiering because they are
not heterosexual, because they are aberrant, because they are unmanly, because they are too
manly, or because they are morally corrupt. And the ‘pro’ arguments generally respond in
kind: gays are indeed fit for service. They may not be heterosexual but they are fighting
machines-ready to die for God and country like any other normal, red-blooded American who
signs up to serve. ‘Pro’ arguments are filled with tales of brave gay servicemembers and
hetero servicemembers supporting their brethren because they have seen first-hand how very
soldierly they actually are. Because the military is seen as a ‘special’ institution-not one open
to all on a democratic basis but rather the few, the chosen, the Marines-the basic equality
claims are invoked less frequently than, say, around marriage or employment rights. ‘Just as
long as he is a good fighter/soldier’ is the dominant supportive trope in DADT repeal
discourse and one that simply cannot work the same way for the marriage question. . . .
Indeed, DADT hinges precisely on this status/conduct distinction: that one can ‘be’ gay
without ‘acting’ (performing) gayness. But what is often ignored in this discussion is that
acting ‘not gay’ (but being gay) requires a performance of another kind, and not simply the
performance of the closet or of dissimulation. If gayness is conduct unbecoming an officer,
then straightness is conduct becoming an officer, and straightness is not just marked through
sexual acts but through the displacements of those acts into soldiering, into killing, into male
bonding, and into brotherhood.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Wolff, supra note 196, at 116970 (“The military is the primary site for the definition of manhood in American culture, and
military service is the most important opportunity for citizens to attain that virtue. . . . The
military’s definition of masculine virtue—a definition that has played a unique role in setting
standards for citizenship status in America—has repeatedly found expression in
discriminatory restrictions on the qualifications for military service.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Lawrence cases achieved some progress in using Lawrence’s incremental impact on
privacy, seeing some elevation in scrutiny review standards, but judicial results were
generally mixed during this period in recognizing disapproval of gays that emanated
from antigay essentialism to restrictions on identity expression.203 Unlike Lawrence,
litigants in these cases hit against a wall of judicial deference to the military trying to
find the kind of animus against sexual minorities that would have otherwise
established unconstitutionality.
Success came with the interesting translation of Lawrence into the gays in the
military context through claims against the policy’s infringement on free speech
expression in Log Cabin Republicans v. U.S.,204 which bolstered identity expression
implications. The idea that DADT had infringed on the expressive rights of gay
servicemembers has existed since its 1993 adoption. Relying on the Lawrence’s
impact on the expression of identity to diminish the usual deference to the military
by seeing that Lawrence as “recognizing the fundamental right to ‘an autonomy of
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct,”205 the District Court in Log Cabin Republicans finally refused to defer to
the military and held that self-referential statements—such as “I am gay”—
amounted not to merely evidentiary proof of actionable conduct under DADT, which
is what other courts had held,206 but rather directly violating First Amendment free
speech.207
The impetus for DADT’s repeal, however, would not result from Log Cabin
Republicans directly. Rather within the same year, efforts going toward the repeal
would be accomplished by the Executive and Legislative branches in full swing.
Eventually, in a move that bore similar sentiment to Log Cabin Republicans,
President Obama, who had vowed to repeal DADT, and Congress moved to repeal
the ban on open sexuality in the military208—a move that was incremental because it
obtained the antidiscrimination within Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory, postdecriminalization of sodomy. Several extensive reports and surveys commissioned to
study a possible repeal reflected the specific regulatory consequences of DADT on
identity expression, concluding that “repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell will not
F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding DADT’s policy reasoning survived rationality); Selland v.
Perry, 100 F.3d 950 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding DADT constitutional); Thomasson v. Perry, 80
F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding DADT via rationality).
203
See Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d. 806, 817-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that
Lawrence provided a higher level of scrutiny than traditional rationality for plaintiff’s due
process claim, but not finding such elevation in review in plaintiff’s equal protection claim);
see also Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 49-52, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding also that Lawrence
allowed a higher level scrutiny of than rationality but that plaintiff’s challenges were
unsuccessful against military deference).
204
Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal 2010), vacated,
658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011).
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have a negative impact on their ability to conduct their military mission”209 and that
“the concern with repeal among many is with open service”210—in other words
expressive liberty.
The Report of the Comprehensive Review of the Issues Associated with a Repeal
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DOD Report) elaborated on just what “open service”
meant with what seemed like a subtle nod to both Romer and Lawrence:
In today’s civilian society, where there is no law that requires gay men and
lesbians to conceal their sexual orientation in order to keep their job, most gay men
and lesbians still tend to be discrete about their personal lives, and guarded about the
people with whom they share information about their sexual orientation.211
Later in another passage, the DOD Report acknowledged more explicitly the
influence of anti-sodomy laws in the historical regulation of sexual identities in the
military: “Prior to 1993, there was no Congressional statute that expressly regulated
homosexuality in the U.S. military: homosexuality in the military was regulated and
restricted through a combination of sodomy prohibitions in military law and military
personnel regulations.”212 When the DOD Report recited the litigation history of
DADT after its enactment in 1993, it revisited the influence of anti-sodomy laws on
Bowers on DADT cases before Lawrence, noting that “[t]hese early Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell cases were decided against a backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 1986
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.”213 However, the DOD Report then acknowledged
the incongruity posed by the change in expressive privacy interests when Lawrence
overruled Bowers and the existence of DADT in the face of Lawrence, and
summarized Lawrence’s incremental impact on the case law post-2003.214
The DOD Report was finally most demonstrative in rejecting the unit cohesion,
effectiveness, and readiness arguments lurking at the opposing end of discriminatory
arguments that litigants losing against DADT faced when courts reached to defer to
the military—reasons that had previously by effect encouraged LGBT
servicemembers not only to hide their sexual identities but play safe by emphasizing
hetero-normative traits that aligned with how the military thought “a good soldier”
might act.215 Relying on its extensive surveying, empirical assessments, and social
science research, the DOD Report relayed that based on servicemembers’ “actual
past and present experiences in a unit with someone they believed to be gay”216 in
Marine combat units, Army combat units, and otherwise, the consensus for a
positive rating on a unit’s cohesive ability to work together with individuals who
were perceived to be gay or lesbian were substantially high—ranging the lowest
from the 84% of Marine servicemembers in combat arms units surveyed approving,
to 89% of Army servicemembers in combat arms units surveyed approving, to 92%
209
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of overall military servicemembers surveyed approving, which as the DOD Report,
touted were “all very high percentages.”217 More profoundly, the DOD Report
surmised the hetero-normative implications of these responses—that “[t]hese survey
results reveal to us a misperception that a gay man does not fit the image of a good
war fighter, a misperception that is almost completely erased when a gay
Servicemember is allowed to prove himself alongside fellow war fighters.”218 As an
amusing anecdote, the DOD Report excerpted the words of one special ops
servicemember in regards to misperceptions of sexual identity: “We have a gay guy
[in the unit]. He’s big. He’s mean, and he kills lots of bad guys. No one cared that he
was gay.”219 In one huge empirical gesture, the DOD Report refuted the prediction of
negative impact by openly-LGBT servicemembers on unit cohesion and underscored
how that prediction revealed the military’s preference of hetero-normative traits.
Similarly, the RAND Update to its 1993 report, Sexual Orientation in the U.S.
Military Personnel Policy220 (Update) which was commissioned as part of the 2010
study on a possible DADT repeal, also heavily criticized the misperceptions and
preferences of identity expression DADT reinforced, perpetuated, and regulated. The
Update drew on comprehensive surveys as well,221 and in one section detailing the
presence and awareness of LGBT servicemembers in the military, the Update noted
that of the LGBT servicemembers surveyed about their “own behavior in disclosing
their orientation within their units,” an aggregate of “two-thirds of respondents
reported that they either pretend to be heterosexual or hide their orientation from
other unit members, and most others are selective in deciding to whom and in what
circumstances they disclose their sexual orientations.”222
Bowing toward incrementalism, the Update briefly mentioned Lawrence and
how decriminalizing same-sex intimacy ten years after DADT’s enactment had
changed the context in which the previous RAND research was based, particularly in
summarizing identity expression.223 At the midpoint of this chapter on the personnel
disclosures of sexual orientation, the Update’s assessment subtly implicates a
rudimentary assumption of sexual orientation that DADT and the historical military
policies had on LGBT individuals.224 Repeatedly, the Update noted that sexual
orientation—although possibly expressed through sexual behavior—and sexual
behavior—although possibly expressive of sexual orientation—were not always
mutually inclusive nor conclusive of one another, that self-identification of
orientation, whether heterosexual or not, does not in every case necessarily lead to
sexual behavior that corresponds to that identification and vice versa: “Shifts in
217
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orientation are particularly likely as a consequence of maturation—a process referred
to as sexual-identity development.”225 If read against DADT, this observation seems
to point out the limits to the military’s previously-powerful, animus-driven directive
to exclude gays in the military—that homosexuality is not now a pathology, as it was
once historically considered; not a threat for excluding sexual minorities, as it was
believed; not a basis for criminalization, but rather a seemingly non-threatening part
of human maturation: “Given that enlisted personnel are typically young adults,
some individuals who do not see themselves as gay or do not engage in same-sex
activity before they enter the military may do so some time after enlisting.”226 Again,
essentialist notions of sexual orientation had been used as a pretextual justification of
a policy hindering identity expression.
In commenting on DADT’s attempt to reinforce fixed traits amongst military
personnel, the Update showed data suggesting that many LGBT servicemembers not
only “pretend[ed] to be heterosexual” but did so in ways that resulted in exhibiting
traits of “good soldiers”227—traits that were stereotypically subsumed under the
military’s outlook on gender characteristic preferences, traits that have been utilized
in contrast to a characterized and stigmatized view of non-heterosexual identities.228
Such data point to the fluidity of sexual identity and direct the harm of DADT’s
categorization of sexual identity back to an abridged personal autonomy shared by
Lawrence.229 As discussed above, although Lawrence was facially concerned with
the intrusion into personal privacy and autonomy that anti-sodomy laws effected,
one of the broader undertow of Lawrence was situated within the way that states
fixated upon criminalizing sodomy as a way to curtail identity expression. Similarly,
regulating behavior and self-identifying speech in DADT intruded upon personal
autonomy rights through suppressing expression in LGBT servicemembers, but the
experience of DADT facially added upon Lawrence because of the way DADT
invaded not only sexual behavior, but other everyday conduct that would be
indicative of a LGBT identity—including identity speech.230 This spill-over into
other kinds of conduct juxtaposed with the fluidity of identities and the performance
of identities within the military exposed the difficulty and inconsistencies of
regulating the social visibility of homosexuality. The extension from Lawrence of
violations within personal autonomy indicate the level of struggle of LGBT
individuals when confronted by this policy in the military—where perhaps as
Lawrence had mandated that such identities could no longer be criminalized, the
225
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sentiment did not foreclose the idea that such identities could still be selectively
marginalized into inconspicuousness. In fact, the incrementalist impact of
Lawrence’s decriminalization of same-sex intimacy and what it meant for identity
expression could be noted in the acknowledgment of Lawrence in the 2010
congressional findings on repealing of the DADT policy.231
The about-face toward the perceived threat to unit cohesion and military
readiness and disapproval of LGBT identities could be partly attributed to the change
in perception in the way sexual identities have been allowed expressive liberty and
visibility in the social fabric since Bowers and even since Lawrence. The repeal
officially took place in late September 2011.232 The DOD Report and Update have
suggested little or minimal impact on unit cohesion or negligible levels of
interruption in operations.233 Studies since the repeal have continuously bolstered
such conclusions.234 These commissioned studies harnessed the changing attitudes
regarding the characterization of sexual minorities in the military and the burgeoning
disconnect between open presence of their identities and optimum operational
benefits shook the military’s traditional belief that only a certain kind of sexual
identity should be imprinted and preferred amongst the ranks. Once this animus
dislodged the rational relationship between the DADT policy and its goals, the
judicial deference that courts used in the past appeared less relevant and the
discriminatory aspects of DADT were, for the most part, finally clarified and
realized. What the repeal did bring was antidiscrimination for LGB servicemembers
so that such identities could be asked about and told without that traditional
hindrance. And that change, despite some limitations, helped propel the
incrementalist journey for the next step federally: the legal recognition of same-sex
couples.
C. Bond over Biology in U.S. v. Windsor
In late February 2013, a month before the Hollingsworth and Windsor arguments
at the Supreme Court, another video about same-sex marriage descended upon the
cultural airwaves. This time, however, unlike NOM’s “Gathering Storm,” the
message was set on a lush, paradisiac beach resort rather than before a computergenerated storm.235 The scenario started simply: two young, fairly-attractive
strangers of the opposite sex are each sitting in adjacent beach chairs on the grassy
knoll of a beach resort, and each with a tablet in hand. Bright sunlight and the
churning of waves consistently highlight the backdrop.236 The woman, trim in a
231
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black swimsuit with her hair slicked back as if she had just finished a swim,
effortlessly reads off her Kindle tablet, when the man, in shorts and a beach shirt and
struggling with the unavoidable glare of sunlight on his iPad, interrupts the woman
and asks her about the functionality of her Kindle; she responds favorably, noting its
features, and how perfect it is for the beach.237 The man then turns back to the screen
of his iPad and, with much satisfaction, navigates his finger on his iPad screen to
buy a Kindle as well.238 When he smilingly turns over to look at the woman and
suggests, “We should celebrate,” in an ambiguous tone, friendly enough to frame his
suggestion as a pick-up line, the woman rejects him: “My husband’s bringing me a
drink right now.”239 What adds complexity to the scene is the man’s unexpected
response, “So is mine,” as they both gesture over to the resort bar behind them to
show each other that their husbands are, in a mirror-like image, on common ground,
each fetching drinks.240 The man’s celebratory suggestion was not nearly as amorous
as the woman (and likely the TV audience) had assumed. It was genuinely
celebratory.
This advertisement—promulgated by internet retailing giant Amazon.com to
promote its tablet241—aired several months after the Obama re-election and just
weeks after Obama’s presidential inaugural address had vowed to bring equal rights
to sexual minorities.242 The country was heating up dramatically with more fervor
toward marriage equality and any possibility of a gathering storm was dissipating;
and instead, momentum was surging for same-sex couples more than ever before.
Although the visibility of wedded same-sex couples vacationing on sandy beach
resorts alongside their different-sex counterparts remains slight, the Kindle ad, like
the man gesturing toward his husband at the bar, was itself gesturing toward an ideal
and a possible norm if the laws were to extend marriage rights to gay couples. Again,
as the ad itself concluded with a camera pan toward a lucid blue sky—that very antithesis of an impending storm—the ad also conveys the message that something far
beyond Kindle tablets and same-sex marriages perpetuates here. This reading is
especially possible after the ad’s protagonists had motioned to their respective
husbands at the bar and a moment passes where it is difficult to tell which husband at
the bar belonged with which of the two speaking characters of the ad.243 The
commercial emphasizes similarities to a point where the differences between the gay
and straight characters seemed insignificant and slightly surprising.
As previously seen, this focus on the similarities between sexual minorities and
the mainstream in areas other than marriage has not always been so forthright. States
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characterized biological differences within sex acts to criminalize sodomy and the
military used essentialized and stereotypical traits between sexual minorities and
heterosexuals to distinguish between “good” and “bad” soldiers for purposes of
exclusion.244 These approaches thrived within the law generally and laws
surrounding marriage also reiterated the antigay essentialism used to marginalize the
relationships between same-sex and different-sex couples. Conventionally, in fact,
essentialism, in aiding natural law and religious morality, has continuously
influenced state refusal to recognize same-sex couples for the purposes of
marriage—and in much the same manner to differentiate and then marginalize sexual
minorities as with anti-sodomy laws and military exclusion.
1. DOMA’s Natural Teleology
The most glaring example of how antigay essentialism buttressed the marriage
issue on the federal level is through the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) passed in
1996.245 In discerning how the Supreme Court’s review of the Windsor case fulfills
our normatively revised step three of the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory of
incrementalism—where same-sex marriage can be part of the legal recognition of
same-sex couples—our enquiry first starts with the essentialist approach within
marriage laws that has helped exclude sexual minorities. As the Court has
destabilized that approach after the 2012-2013 term, we again will see with Windsor
that the same-sex marriage debate is more than just about the concept of same-sex
marriage and that it is the social visibility and the expression of sexual orientation
that is ultimately at stake.
Prior to Windsor, Section 3 of DOMA had fixed the definition of marriage so
that federally, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”246 Within the congressional
thought-process leading up to DOMA’s passage, biology was again raised as the
reason why marriage has traditionally been fixed as a union between different-sex
individuals and why same-sex unions could not be recognized under that label.247
The House of Representatives report exuded heterosexism in its accounts toward
“defending” marriage in an essentialist configuration when it deferred, at length, to
Hadley Arkes’ testimony for authority on the subject matter:
244
See Courtney Megan Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive Economic Perspective
on the Law’s Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH & LEE. L. REV. 393, 459 (2007)
(“Marriage traditionalists routinely appeal to natural law arguments in order to justify both
what the current legal regime is and what it should be. Moreover, like the nineteenth-century
essentialists, they also suggest that a positive law that recognizes same-sex marriage is (or
would be) fraudulent because it contravenes natural law.” (footnote omitted)); see also Baker
v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (“The institution of marriage as a union of man
and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as
old as the book of Genesis.” (referencing Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942))).
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Our engendered existence, as men and women, offers the most
unmistakable, natural signs of the meaning and purpose of sexuality. And
that is the function and purpose of begetting. At its core, it is hard to
detach marriage from what may be called the “natural teleology of the
body”: namely the inescapable fact that only two people, not three, only a
man and woman, can beget a child.248
Procreation was the proclaimed goal of marriage between different-sex couples
and by consequence, the House concluded that “civil society has an interest in
maintaining and protecting the institution of heterosexual marriage because it has a
deep and abiding interest in encouraging responsible procreation and childrearing.
Simply put, government has an interest in marriage because it has an interest in
children.”249 The permanency of this “natural teleology of the body” was
assembled—if not by implying at first procreation itself and the biological tie-in to
the “body”—by a quote used in the House report from the Council on Families in
America that underscored that marriage exists as “our most universal social
institution, found prominently in virtually every known society”250 because of “the
irreplaceable role that marriage plays in childrearing and generational continuity.”251
By falsely reaching toward the universal, the interest of procreation and childrearing
was propped as the biological and natural reason why marriage has been exclusively
for different-sex couples.
This hetero-normative tautology (or “teleology”) leads easily to an implicit
dichotomy that excludes unions not biologically embodying that “natural teleology
of the body” to qualify for the marriage label: ones that also exist in the world but
did not historically procreate. That differentiation stands exactly for why DOMA
secured the marriage label for different-sex unions but not same-sex ones; the
artificial focus on biology spotlights the reproductive potential of different-sex
couples as the prominent reason for keeping marriage from same-sex couples when
other reasons why marriages exist are possible—reasons that could allow for
including other relationship configurations within marriage. Most patent in its use of
essentialism as a shield to prop up the exclusion of same-sex couples in marriage
was the House’s anticipation and rejection of two possible rebuttals to its essentialist
tautology, rebuttals that would quash constructionist sentiments to marriage. First,
the House claimed that the fact that the law allows different-sex couples to marry
without indicating their intent to have children was a negligible one because the
underlying procreative policy of marriage reserves the institution for those couples
who do: “[S]ociety has made the eminently sensible judgment to permit
heterosexuals to marry, notwithstanding the fact that some couples cannot or simply
choose not to have children.”252 Similarly, the House also raised the “divorce
revolution” as an argued threat to marriage that overshadowed the changes that
same-sex couples might bring to the institution.253 Although the report
248
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acknowledged the disruption to childrearing that divorce brought to the traditional
nuclear family—which could have been interpreted to signify that procreation likely
was not the underlying teleology of the body that bodes essential for marriage—the
House, nevertheless, found that because threats already existed in marriages between
different-sex individuals, it would be imperative to protect marriage from other
perceived threats including that of same-sex couples gathering and readying to storm
across the gates of marriage to push that natural teleology off its course: “[T]he fact
that marriage is embattled is surely no argument for opening a new front in the
war.”254 The House’s rhetorical responses to both of these rebuttals revealed how
essentialism was harnessed to prolong an exclusion that would never envision the
hypothetical couple in the Kindle commercial, but align itself rather with the
sentiments of NOM’s looming, tempestuously hyperbolic panic over same-sex
marriage. The opponents are always seemingly spotting a brewing storm somewhere.
This kind of strategy behind DOMA for keeping marriage restricted to same-sex
couples falls squarely in line with the classic paradigms of the marriage institution
used to hinder legal recognition of same-sex marriages. Early litigation of marriage
equality in the 1970s upheld the exclusion of marriage from same-sex couples based
on the finding that historically marriage between different-sex couples was
“uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family”255 and
saw this consequence as permanent and “as old as the book of Genesis.”256 Often this
biological difference was then intertwined with natural law and Judeo-Christian
arguments to create a wall of reasoning that excluded same-sex couples based on
procreation and childrearing to swallow up other existing justifications for marriage
that would focus the attention toward a constructivist notion of marriage.257 Marta
Nussbaum has criticized this focus on the biological aspect by attempting to define
marriage more broadly, observing that “[t]he institution of marriage houses and
supports several distinct aspects of human life: sexual relations, friendship and
254
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companionship, love, conversation, procreation and child rearing, mutual
responsibility. Marriages can exist without each of these.”258 By cataloging other
justifications for marriage, Nussbaum raises the idea of marriage as a construct that
includes essentialist goals, and sheds light on how it is a construct that has been
hijacked by marriage equality opponents, such as those who have advocated
successfully for the passing of DOMA and campaigned for Proposition 8 in ways
that molded that construction with a false sense of fixed biology, rather than
allowing marriage to be “plural in both content and meaning.”259
For sexual minorities specifically, a definition based on false teleology has had a
regulatory effect on the identity expression. Analogous to how civil unions and
domestic partnerships could be seen as laws that can classify same-sex couples as
second-class citizens, the refusal to extend marriage to same-sex couples, as a result
of defining marriage according to teleology, is another similar way in which the law
can brand sexual minorities as the lesser. And this result arises directly from
hindering the identities of sexual minorities again—like the instances noted from
Bowers and DADT—from being expressed in any meaningful and comparable way
that heterosexual identities are expressed. Scholars have noted this type of
performativity for sexual orientation within the personal relationships that people
cultivate that could end up as marriages.260 According to Douglas NeJaime recently,
“[s]exual orientation by its very nature includes an active, relational component.
Sexual orientation identity is linked to (both actual and contemplated) relationships
with other bodies.”261 The social, relationship (or relational) aspect of one’s life can
be the tip-off—so to speak—of one’s sexual orientation. NeJaime cites and
synthesizes the works of others such as Kenji Yoshino, Janet Halley, Hau-ling Lau,
and Mary Anne Case, as well, to show that others have made the particular
observation that in the public and social sphere one could externalize one’s sexual
identity via the image of a couple.262 His emphasis is on the visible “enactment” of
orientation through relationships:
Conduct, in the form of same-sex relationships, enacts lesbian or gay
identity. Entering, performing, and publicly showing a same-sex
relationship serves as a central way of embracing and maintain one’s
lesbian or gay identity. This goes beyond the idea that intimate
relationships are important to selfhood and identity, instead explicitly
linking a certain type of relationship to a specific identity. Same-sex
relationships, in this sense, publicly enact lesbian and gay identity.263
258
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As Mary Anne Case writes compatibly, “[t]he couple is a mediating term
between status and conduct, private and public, sameness and difference, and the
sexual and nonsexual aspects of gay identity. Just as ‘couple is both a noun and a
verb, and in a gay couple conduct and status slip ineluctably into one another.”264 An
individual’s sexual orientation is observable distinctly through relationships. And as
Case observes further, the visibility of relationships and coupling behavior is hard to
deny since slippage between the grammatical definitions of the word also translates
to how “[t]he couple can be simultaneously the situs for the most private of intimate
relationships and the most public representation of it. And in a gay couple the signs
of sameness and difference with respect to heterosexual pairs are both clearly
visible.”265 Thus, in some ways similar to how skin color could express race,
relationships are part of how sexual identity is expressed and how different sexual
identities can be differentiated.
And within inequalities of power and social visibility, that differentiation for
sexual identities has led to marginalization. From behind the bench, Judge Stephen
Reinhardt, writing for the Ninth Circuit in the majority decision in Perry v.
Brown,266 articulated a sentiment similar to Case’s notion of differentiation but
furthers it even more in the realm of social and legal visibility when he recounted the
visible performativity of orientation in the context of heterosexual coupling behavior
and marriage in order to raise consciousness to the existing inequality that the law
(and society) has placed on same-sex coupling behavior:
We are regularly given forms to complete that ask us whether we are
“single” or “married.” Newspapers run announcements of births, deaths,
and marriages. We are excited to see someone ask, “Will you marry me?”,
whether on bended knee in a restaurant or in text splashed across a
stadium Jumbotron. Certainly it would not have the same effect to see
“Will you enter into a registered domestic partnership with me?”.267
Reinhart illustrates how the law restricts the expressive acts of couples and how
that restriction is tied to sexual identity. Because of the restriction on relationships,
none of these expressive acts of coupling has as much visibility for sexual minorities
as they are commonplace for different-sex couples—although they could. Within the
context of domestic partnerships, the outline of a second-class citizen connotation is
clearly drawn in the subtext of Reinhart’s illustration. Reinhart intimates that
ubiquitously different-sex couples can and do propose marriage on Jumbotrons at
sports games; it is a spectacle when it happens because it celebrates and reifies
marriage, and it is also likely a bit mundane since every different-sex couple more
easily possess that option.268 Same-sex couples are precluded from having that
frequent opportunity, and any proposal for an alternative to marriage exhibited on
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Jumbotrons just seem symbolically lesser.269 This marginalization of identity
expression stems from the law and its value judgments on same-sex relationships.
If marriage is, as Nussbaum describes, a construct, and if coupling behavior,
including marital status, is an expression of sexual orientation, then the marriage
restriction to only opposite sex couples and not same-sex couples regulate—with
much the same result as anti-sodomy laws and DADT—the identity expression of
sexual minorities. Essentializing the differences between sexual orientations lies at
the core of refusing to extend marriage to same-sex couples. And federally, in
progressing onto the revised final step in the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory—the
legal recognition of same-sex relationships, including marriage equality itself—the
Supreme Court’s review of DOMA in Windsor unfastens that entanglement with
antigay essentialism in order to surmount another transition away from essentialist
approach to sexual identity.
2. Windsor and the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships
As if almost an acknowledgment of incrementalism, it was ten years to the day of
the Lawrence decision when the Supreme Court released its opinion in Windsor.270
Again, Kennedy authored another gay rights decision this time; and instead of
dealing with sexual conduct between consensual adults, he would find the federal
definition of marriage in section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional.271 Specifically,
Windsor’s rejection of the definition of marriage as exclusively reserved for
different-sex couples was premised on an approach that moved dramatically away
from the negative essentializing of sexual orientation—but does not yet fully endorse
a pro-gay constructivist approach to sexual orientation, despite focusing on marriage
as a bond in Windsor in similar fashion to Nussbaum. Windsor does account for the
conduct and significance behind marriage for the purposes of broadening the
definition, rather than place a heavy reliance on biology. But it must be carefully
noted that there was no simultaneous adoption of constructivism in any real capacity.
The plaintiff, Edith Windsor, and her deceased spouse, Thea Spyer, had been a
couple since 1963 and were formally domestic partners in New York City in 1993
before later marrying in 2007 in Canada.272 After marriage, they continued their lives
in New York City, and New York State legally recognized their Canadian
marriage.273 When Spyer passed away in 2009, she left her entire estate to Windsor,
but because DOMA did not recognize same-sex marriages, Windsor was not
qualified for the marital exemption under federal estate taxes.274 After paying
$363,053 in estate taxes from the IRS, she subsequently sought a refund, but was
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denied the request.275 Windsor then brought the suit that would eventually invalidate
Section 3 of DOMA.276
The Court’s disapproval of DOMA was two-fold: first it offended federalism
principles and secondly it discriminated against same-sex couples.277 Both of
DOMA’s harsh results were accomplished in some way via the essentialization of
marriage. In illustrating the unconstitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, Windsor
focused on how the federal definition of marriage as between man and woman
overstepped the boundaries of states’ prerogatives in determining their own
definitions—specifically addressing the intervention that DOMA conceived against
the ability for states to participate in the process of patchwork incrementalism as
Jane Schacter had observed in which states are already engaged.278 And what
Windsor found was that such intervention struck at states’ ability to define the
marital relationship.279 As a result, the Court saw DOMA’s intervention created
“injury and indignity”280 in the form of “a deprivation of an essential part of the
liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment”281—especially when DOMA removed a
right federally from a class of people that New York state specifically empowers: the
right of same-sex individuals to have their coupling behavior be expressed as a
lawful marriage, or in essence, the expression of sexual identity for sexual minorities
on the state level to be consistent with the federal.282 This deprivation was also on
top of the other deprivations the majority noticed resided in other realms including,
inter alia, taxes, benefits, housing, criminality, and intellectual property.283 The
deprivation reflected conflicts between federal and state incrementalisms; DOMA
did not deprive different-sex married couples from New York from recognition on
the federal level, but did so against same-sex couples who were also married by New
York law. These effects demonstrated both federalism and also discriminatory
results.
In gearing up to apply an enhanced rational basis analysis to DOMA, Kennedy
shed light on that injury and indignity by finding that the definition of marriage need
not be predicated on biology: “In acting first to recognize and then allow same-sex
marriages, New York was responding ‘to the initiative of those who [sought] a voice
in shaping the destiny of their own times.’ ”284 Rather than relying on the “natural
teleology of the body,” the Court approached the purpose of marriage as less
biologically or essentially determined, underlining the constructive element of
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marriage where the union could have the different meanings that Nussbaum has
articulated, meanings tied to the person, and that perhaps the policy of regulating
marriage should reflect that concept of marriage. In viewing marriage, the Court
reconstructed the definition in order to see it as “a far-reaching legal
acknowledgment of the intimate relationships between two people, a relationship
deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other
marriages.”285 When the Court placed New York State’s recognition of same-sex
marriages within “far-reaching,”286 the description, “far-reaching,” implies more
than a fixed biology. And the Court did not want to disturb that “far-reaching”
approach because “[i]t reflects both the community’s considered perspective on the
historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the
meaning of equality.”287 Marriage is an institution that is not fixed in meaning but
historically ever-evolving to service the social context in which it reflects, which
means it can embrace cultural pluralist views about the institution.288 Intrinsically,
the Windsor majority viewed marriage in a less essentialist way than those who
stood behind a “natural” teleology to propagate DOMA.
The Court could have included and merely subordinated essentialist views of
marriage as just one of the myriad of justifications within a constructivist spectrum
of marriage. Yet, Windsor found in its enhanced rational basis analysis how
essentialism was isolated and manipulated into a construction of its own that made
salient and viable the natural law and religious arguments against extending marriage
to same-sex couples, but also allowed enough severe approbation against sexual
minorities to amount to legislative animus. Here is where animus-focused
jurisprudence has its continuation from Romer and maturation in Windsor as the
Court now unleashed it in the issue of same-sex marriage. Kennedy wrote that “[t]he
House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of homosexuality,
and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’ ”289 In order to reach that moral disapproval
and defend marriage, the House first had to argue for that natural teleology of the
body, it had to go toward biology and use it to draw up differences between samesex couples and different-sex couples—homosexuals and heterosexuals—that could
be used to marginalize the way that identity could be expressed and ultimately
regulated it in a discriminatory way.290 The Court mentioned, inter alia, “stigma,”291
“second-class,”292 and “second-tier,”293 to characterize how DOMA visualized the
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relationships of sexual minorities—and perhaps, by extension, sexual minorities
themselves—on the federal level, and the result was multi-faceted; not only did the
exclusion have significance within marriage itself on a general wave but it also
resonated in the apparent conflict between New York and federal laws.294 The Court
opined that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned
marriages and make them unequal” and illustrated in a conflated way just how
DOMA interfered with state law and at the same time discriminated against samesex couples. Not only that but “[b]y this dynamic DOMA undermines both the
public and private significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells
those couples, and all the world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of
federal recognition. . . . The differentiation demeans the couple[.]”295 The Court
remarked that this marginalization had significance for children of same-sex
families,296 which stretched the social visibility impact of DOMA even further, and
echoed Kennedy’s remarks at oral arguments.297 Ultimately, all of this
differentiation, all of this indignity, all of this moral disapproval by DOMA had a
starting point: the misappropriation of essentialism to dominate a discriminatory
viewpoint. In Windsor, the Court abandoned that old essentialist approach of
viewing marriage and moved toward a commonalities approach that recognizes that
the bond of marriage needs more consideration than biological differences between
same-sex and different-sex relationships.298 This view differs from the us-versusthem dichotomy that the NOM’s “Gathering Storm” ad stressed, and situates us all
getting drinks at the beach bar in the Amazon.com ad. It is a broader approach that
would permit—though the Court did not declaratively endorse here—constructivist
readings of marriage, and possibly, by extension, constructivist approaches to sexual
identity. And as step three of Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk theory was being met on the
federal level by the review of the marriage equality issue in Windsor, the recognition
that the past discrimination has violated the dignity of sexual minorities by
subordinating and regulating their identities also ushers in another moment where an
antigay essentialism was detached from this realm of sexual orientation law.
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3. Windsor and Revised Step Three in the Eskridge-Merin-Waaldijk Incrementalism
Throughout Windsor, the notion of incrementalism is apparent. The Court’s
acknowledgment “that, until recent years, many citizens had not even considered the
possibility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status
and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage,”299 that different-sex
relationships have “no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to the
very definition of the term,”300 and that within the recent challenges “came the
beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight,”301 illustrates stratagems of slow,
incremental negotiations in the decision-making process that has led up to the
moment in Windsor. Likewise, the Court noted incrementalist decision-making in
New York’s adoption of same-sex marriage—through piecemeal steps over a period
of time:
Slowly at first and then in rapid course, the laws of New York came to
acknowledge the urgency of this issue for same-sex couples who wanted to affirm
their commitment to one another before their children, their family, their friends, and
their community. And so New York recognized same-sex marriages performed
elsewhere; and then it later amended its own marriage laws to permit same-sex
marriage.302
And it was “[a]fter a statewide deliberative process that enabled its citizens to
discuss and weigh arguments for and against same-sex marriage, New York acted to
enlarge the definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or
understood.”303 In both passages, the Court drew the endgame of the incrementalist
unit here with the law of New York allowing same-sex couples to express their
relationships—their same-sex relationships—in the same light as possibly differentsex relationships, avoiding the previous injustices. And the process was through
deliberate and gradual thought indicative of Lindblom’s incrementalism.
Additionally, the acknowledgement toward incrementalism is reflected
substantively in Windsor by Kennedy’s reference to Lawrence during the moments
where the majority weakened DOMA’s authority over regulating relationships. Both
instances where the Court explicitly mentioned Lawrence, that muddled protection
over consensual same-sex intimacy was converted into the protected privacy of
consenting adult relationships—including same-sex ones—that could be used to
dislodge DOMA’s regulatory command over same-sex couples. Windsor builds
incrementally from the significance of Lawrence on privacy and relationships, but
interestingly, the Court also used Lawrence to gesture away from essentialism. In the
first quotation of Lawrence, the Court used Lawrence to focus on the commitment
aspect of a relationship rather than biology: “Private, consensual sexual intimacy
between two adult persons of the same sex may not be punished by the State, and it
can form ‘but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.’”304 The Court’s
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second direct Lawrence quotation uncovered how that focus on biology created
separate categories hindering identity expression in a shameful way for sexual
minorities: “The differentiation [by DOMA] demeans the couple, whose moral and
sexual choices the Constitution protects, see Lawrence, [citations omitted], and
whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.”305 In both references, the
Windsor Court harnessed Lawrence’s potency in privacy and broadened it to
highlight incrementalist and anti-essentialist aspects of the opinion. As we will
explore shortly, this borrowing from Lawrence bears importance in animus-focused
jurisprudence.
Windsor also recognizes Schacter’s patchwork or federalist incrementalism, not
just by its deference to states’ rights in regulating domestic relationships of citizenry
and limiting how much federal powers can interfere with states marriage definitions,
but also by noticing how many states that have now moved toward marriage
equality: “New York, in common with, as of this writing, 11 other States and the
District of Columbia, decided that same-sex couples should have the right to
marry[.]”306 Other such incidental references run throughout the decision, helping
the Court articulate that DOMA acts “[a]gainst this background of lawful same-sex
marriage in some States,”307 and that DOMA’s “operation is directed to a class of
persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other States, have sought to
protect.”308 By constantly reminding the public that DOMA persisted on a stage
conflicting with a small, but growing handful of states that legally recognizes the
marriages of same-sex couples, the Court also perpetuated that patchwork
incrementalism occurring within the prerogatives of federalism and without any
unneeded interference. The patchwork incrementalist effect possessed much
significance for the Windsor Court because it allowed the majority to exemplify the
intervention that DOMA’s definition of marriage placed against states’ rights and
also—in New York state’s circumstance—the discriminatory slippage between
recognizing married same-sex couples on the state level, but not the federal.309
Finally, as with all other steps examined in the U.S. journey of the EskridgeMerin-Waaldijk incrementalism, the arrival of this step with Windsor predominately,
achieves incrementalism’s projected progress federally—legal recognition of samesex marriages. But as progressive as such review of marriage equality is, the Court
also retained some potential accomplishments yet unfulfilled. For instance, now that
DOMA’s Section 3 definition of marriage has been invalidated, what about Section
2’s restrictions, which Windsor did not review? Although the federal government
must now recognize a valid state-sponsored same-sex marriage under Windsor, that
recognition does not translate from state to state. Does Section 2 violate the Full
Faith and Credit Clause? Does it also hinder the patchwork incrementalism and
305
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interstate travel? These enquiries have been left untouched by Windsor, saved for
another confrontation.
Still, tremendous potency arises in Windsor as the Supreme Court review that
reaches legal recognition of married same-sex couples. Federally, the marriage
equality debate in the U.S. has taken the last step within the Eskridge-MerinWaaldijk teleology. In invalidating DOMA’s Section 3, Windsor also ended a
federal method of regulating the expression of sexual identity through coupling
behavior and signals a moment in which antigay essentialism, which had propelled
DOMA but was found as animus, was abandoned for an approach that deemphasizes biology over the commonalities of experience between same-sex and
different-sex couples. Subsequently, Part IV will examine how Windsor’s use of
animus from Lawrence and Romer has significance for sexual minority issues going
forth.
IV. THE CONVERGENCE OF INCREMENTALISM AND WINDSOR: ANIMUS-FOCUSED
JURISPRUDENCE
From Lawrence to Windsor, the incrementalist journey has brought about an
abandonment in the law of an antigay essentialist approach toward sexual
orientation. The law is subordinating that approach in gay rights and recognizing
that, by dealing with how identity expression was regulated by heavy reliance on a
negative essentialism resulted in marginalizing sexual minorities. But what else is
the product of this step-by-step transition? Does abandoning this certain kind of
essentialist approach also mean the law is categorically embracing constructivism?
Windsor does not suggest this premise. But instead, although antigay essentialism
was undone, the law was working around the narrow structures that frame—for
better or worse—our identity politics as it reached toward federal recognition of
same-sex marriage. This warrants normative commentary. Ultimately, Windsor did
not replace essentialism with constructivism; it has not taken any heavy sides in that
murky and often explosive discourse—particularly over sexual orientation, an area
where the essentialist-versus-constructivist divide has afforded no clear outcome.310
For now, rather, the law has selected a more functional way of furthering the rights
of sexual minorities to reflect social trends and legitimacy by resorting to a
developing body of animus-focused jurisprudence. And its emergence, in
simultaneous contrast with the abandoning of antigay essentialism, is the resonating
and peculiar potential borne from the marriage between sexual orientation
jurisprudence and marriage equality incrementalism. Animus-focused jurisprudence
offers much in its fitness to deal with equality while keeping antigay essentialism at
bay. Yet, Windsor has shortcomings. This Part will address both observations.
310
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A. History, Background, and Suitability
Animus-focused jurisprudence had its first major Supreme Court encounter with
sexual orientation in Romer v. Evans, when the Court found that Colorado’s
Amendment 2 discriminated against sexual minorities because, under rationality
review, the initiative’s denial of legal protection to sexual minorities could not be
justified by its specific disapproval of a particular group.311 But the rational basis
review used there did not altogether resemble the highly deferential rational basis
review that the Court has applied in other cases, rather this specific species of
rational basis in Romer was one in which legislative animus was the featured culprit
behind the irrationality of a law, similar to that found in such cases as Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno312 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,313
cases that invalidated laws that specifically targeted an individual group. Rather than
entertaining the issue of discrimination against gays under a heightened review that
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications would warrant, Romer bypassed an analysis
that would have involved the Court conceptualizing orientation as a protectable
identity trait under tiered scrutiny for a focus, instead, on the animus behind the
legislation to invalidate Amendment 2.314 As discussed earlier, Lawrence, although
not an equal protection case, relied on Romer; subsequently, the pre-2003 DADT
cases relied on Lawrence; and most recently, Windsor draws from this jurisprudence
by relying on both Romer and Lawrence to find the animus behind DOMA’s
promulgation, rendering its definition of marriage unconstitutional.315 Windsor is the
third Supreme Court case in this line that has used animus in some fashion to address
a legal marginalization of sexual minorities, which bears significance for both sexual
orientation jurisprudence and potentially the jurisprudence resolving discriminatory
practices against other potentially-marginalized identities.
In lieu of adding sexual orientation as a new suspect class, the move toward an
enhanced rational basis review (one with “bite” or “teeth”) that offers equal
protection through a finding of animus makes functional sense. Most glaringly,
animus and an enhanced rational basis allows the Court to avoid the arduous task of
articulating just what about sexual orientation would classify it as suspect under the
traditional tiered scrutiny of equal protection jurisprudence—a classification which
some have argued has closed since the 1970s.316 For a group to open the doors to that
classification, the balancing of several factors would favor such classification,
including (1) the group’s political powerlessness; (2) the group’s history of
discrimination; (3) immutability of group’s characteristic traits; (4) the connection
between characteristic and discriminatory legislation.317 Though others believe that
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See Suzannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 927
(2012); see also Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened
Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1755-56 (1996).
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sexual orientation should deservedly be included in a class that triggers heightened
scrutiny,318 developing the case for it under those factors poses challenging
hurdles.319 For one, under the factor dealing with the political powerlessness of a
group, the narrowing of history itself to only the very recent decades has shaded the
argument that gays, of late, have not been as politically powerless of a group,
ignoring the disproportionately large amount of oppressive time that sexual
minorities have endured preceding the gay rights movement and continue, in some
ways, to endure.320 But also hard to surpass is the misunderstanding between the
biological and the cultural aspects of sexual orientation poses either a threat to
salient arguments favoring classification or even offer convincing counterarguments
that undermine the goal of classification.321 As we have seen how essentialism could
be harnessed to differentiate and then subjugate the power and existence of a
disfavored group, so can constructivism, on the opposite end, be harnessed, without
deftness, to articulate that choice that negates immutability. The immutability
enquiry potentially creates a nature-versus-nurture binary that is both difficult to
articulate and also easy to distort.322 Although commentators have argued strongly
318

See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 143, at 102; see also In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384, 413 (Cal. 2008).
319
See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 76 (1996)
(“[J]udges might claim it is too difficult to pin anything so concrete as “suspect class” status
on this murky, contextual, and poorly charted human variation.” (footnote omitted)).
320

See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting suspect
classification for sexual orientation based partly on finding that “[i]n these times homosexuals
are proving that they are not without growing political power”).
321

See Massaro, supra note 319, at 76 (“A third complication is the so-called
‘immutability’ question—a question which is not as easily eliminated as some commentators
hope. Are people ‘born gay,’ as some tentative, emerging scientific data now suggests? Or is
sexual orientation a chosen or acquired identity? If one can ‘choose’ to hinder the formation of
an active gay identity or the commission of ‘gay acts,’ then legislation criminalizing or
otherwise discouraging active gay identities and sexual acts may seem rational. How would
the courts respond to social constructivist claims that one is not born a homosexual’ but made
one by historic, economic, political, and social forces—the very forces the law transfixes
through equal protection law? One judicial response might be to say that the more porous and
malleable the borders of heterosexuality, the more justifiable is the official policing of those
borders—at least if one accepts the (still) prevalent view that society should, if possible,
eradicate homosexuality. Alternatively, a judge could more sympathetically deny gay rights
by ruling that sexuality is fluid. Not only do political and social factors influence generally the
formation of sexual identity, but individually, few people are exclusively, saliently or
consistently ‘heterosexual’ or ‘nonheterosexual.’ Thus, judges might claim it is too difficult to
pin anything so concrete as ‘suspect clas’ status on this murky, contextual, and poorly charted
human variation. Even gay rights advocates recognize the dangers of concretizing and
essentializing the category of nonheterosexuality and potentially denying its fluidity, variety,
and contextuality. In fact, many advocates of gay rights find this to be one more unacceptable
double-bind.” (footnotes omitted)).
322
See Andrea M. Kimball, Note, Romer v. Evans and Colorado’s Amendment 2: The Gay
Movement’s Symbolic Victory in the Battle for Civil Rights, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 219, 239
(1997) (“Currently, the issue of immutability is much like a never-ending nature verses
nurture debate which makes the equal protection immutability analysis difficult.”); see also
Alafair S. R. Burke, A Few Straight Men: Homosexuals in the Military and Equal Protection,
6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 109, 112 (1994) (“[T]he immutability requirement is the most
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that the binary is simplistically false and demonstrated more lenient arguments for
establishing immutability,323 the proverbial verdict is still out on the methods to
harness this factor in determining suspect classification and, for sexual minorities,
that uncertainty could pose as something either navigable or treacherous in litigation
where certainty takes a premium.
Constructivism—although perhaps a more empowering approach to studying and
comprehending sexual identity sociologically—adds to the difficulties in arguing for
immutability because it can be manipulated into transforming ideas that deal with the
cultural, social, and political aspects of one’s sexual identity to sounding as if being
a sexual minority is a choice. That choice, as many would argue more precisely, is
not correctly dealing with the cause of sexual orientation, which many would say is
natural (thus slightly essentialist), but is attributed to how sexual orientation is
expressed by the individual to reinforce that identity, whether that choice is innate or
influenced externally.324 In a sense, there is something both mutable and essential
about orientation.325 As Caren Dubnoff has written,
[s]exual orientation is likewise a personal attribute that goes beyond
conduct. One need not hold that sexual orientation is immutable or
biologically determined to see it as a personal attribute. Moreover, there is
increasing evidence that supports the view that sexual orientation often
involves a genetic component. Like religion, it is often a central aspect of
an individual’s identity and it is more or less permanent.326
difficult hurdle to establishing sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect classification. But
regardless of the outcome of this ‘nature versus nurture’ debate, it is becoming increasingly
clear that one's sexual orientation (either by environmental influences or by genetic fate) is
fixed early in life and is unlikely to change.” (footnotes omitted)); Kimberly Richman, Lovers,
Legal Strangers, and Parents: Negotiating Parental and Sexual Identity in Family Law, 36
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 285, 298 (2002) (“The familiar ‘nature versus nurture’ debate is politicized
by the important social and legal consequences its answers have for LGBT communities,
individuals, and their families. At stake in particular are two widely significant questions:
first, is homosexuality an ‘immutable trait’ that can be protected as a suspect status under
equal protection doctrine and civil rights laws; and second, is homosexuality socially learned
or otherwise communicable.”).
323

See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646,
651-57 (2001).
324
See Ortiz, supra note 310, at 1835 (“[Constructivism] is not, as many think, a debate
even partly about the causes of homosexuality but rather one about the most appropriate
descriptions of gay identity.”).
325
See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 568 (1994) (“Disaggregating the various
forms of essentialism and constructivism thus indicates that they are actually intertwined in all
but the most extreme ends of their own ranges, and offers the possibility of finding a
conceptual location from which pro-gay essentialists and pro-gay constructivists can frame
legal arguments that avoid the argument from immutability while not contradicting its
empirical predicate. Recent sexuality studies in history, anthropology, and cultural studies
vary more or less continuously in the depth of their claim that sexual-orientation categories
are socially contingent.”).
326
Caren G. Dubnoff, Romer v. Evans: A Legal and Political Analysis, 15 LAW & INEQ.
275, 310-11 (1997).
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Dubnoff demonstrates a conceptual reality about sexual identity, analogous with
race or gender.327 But this notion, which sounds plausible in sociological debates,
then appear more shaky and subjective in a venue where fact-finding and truthseeking places a premium on reaching a higher level of clarity, as truth and fact are
tied inevitably to rights and remedies.328 Thus, pinning down that something seems
like a tall order. In some ways, the current pro-gay sociological debates about sexual
identity do not easily facilitate the establishment of sexual minorities as a suspect
class.329
As Janet Halley, who has written extensively on the subtleties of the essentialistversus-constructivist dichotomies in sexual orientation,330 has distinctively
articulated, when arguing from a pro-gay perspective in litigation, a “middle ground”
should be reached between essentialism and constructivism.331 Thusly,
sexual orientation, no matter what causes it, acquires social and political
meaning through the material and symbolic activities of living people.
This is the arena of representation, the arena in which we signify to one
another who we are, negotiate the norms attaching to that, and arrange
and rearrange power along the sexual orientation hierarchy.332
Within tiered scrutiny and establishing suspect classification, this articulation
bears worth. Despite robust reliance by courts, academic critics have observed tiered
scrutiny’s frailties.333 The criticisms deal mostly with tiered scrutiny’s ability to be
workable with “real world” issues of diversity that may not be captured by the levels
of classifications,334 with tiered scrutiny’s adherence to “big picture” generalizations
327
Id. See generally Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 1467 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
328
See Halley, supra note 325, at 528 (“Pro-gay litigation has a number of important
objectives. It seeks concrete remedies for plaintiffs who have been materially harmed by antigay discrimination. . . . More broadly, it seeks to establish rules of law that will benefit gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals (and, it is to be hoped, other subordinated groups as well), either
in subsequent litigation or through the gradual and mysterious processes by which legal rules
shape public and private norms.”).
329
Corrine Blacklock, Comment, Hollingsworth v. Perry: Expressive Harm and the Stakes
of “Marriage”, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 217, 237 (2013) (“Part of the
reason the [Supreme] Court has never explicitly announced a heightened standard may be that
gays and lesbians do not fit neatly within the equal protection ‘suspect class’ criteria.”
(footnote omitted)).
330

Halley, supra note 325.

331

Id. at 568.

332

Id. at 506.

333
See e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens
and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Protection, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2342-45
(2006).
334
See Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 897 (“[T]he tiers-of-scrutiny framework operates as an
outcome matrix, thereby short-circuiting rather than deepening substantive inquiry into the
fairness of any particular form of discrimination. And indeed, one sees a pattern in equal
protection decisions where much time and attention is paid to determining the applicable level
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that create rigid incongruences when issues are examined more subtly,335 and with
tiered scrutiny’s adequate fulfillment of the goals of equal protection.336 If those
problems do precisely plague the tiered scrutiny setup, then perhaps arguing
specificity too readily from one end of the binary—whether nature or nurture,
essentialist or constructivist—ventures against such problems and creates an
artificial hurdle to achieving equality for sexual minorities. In this fashion, extending
Halley’s view, perhaps the answer for sexual minorities lies not within identity
politics and theory, but within middle grounds and commonalities of human
experiences as well. As Halley puts it, “[l]itigating on common ground is thus not
only the right thing to do—it is also more likely to work.”337
In contrast to heightened scrutiny, the animus-focused, enhanced rational basis
alternative that the Supreme Court has used to deal with legal issues involving
sexual orientation—e.g., discrimination, privacy, marriage equality—has focused,
without getting to the essentialist-versus-constructivist debate over sexual
orientation, on commonalities of human experience and the violation of that
commonality for a group through biases that formulate discrimination. Finding
animus is helpful in this way because the judicial investigation focuses less on
sociological debates about identity and reaches more toward the invidious reasons
behind a piece of legislation. In theorizing the origins of animus-focused
jurisprudence used in Romer, Akhil Amar has made its connection, not to any
doctrine that raises identity politics, but instead to the Attainder Clause338 and argues
that Romer’s use of animus allowed the issue to be rephrased not to read “whether
sexual orientation can be treated differently (from, say, race); but whether gays and
bis can be treated differently (from straights).”339 Suzanne Pollvogt similarly
observes this doctrinal focus of animus by remarking that “the doctrine of
unconstitutional animus expresses core values of the federal Equal Protection Clause
that transcend the Court's rigid tiers-of-scrutiny framework.”340 This emphasis is
facially and particularly noticeable in Kennedy’s framing of these issues in Romer in
terms of the protection that Amendment 2 denied sexual minorities and particularly
how Amendment 2 stands incompatible to our broad principles of access to justice:
of judicial scrutiny; once this question is answered, the analysis proceeds succinctly and
superficially. If the Court rejects arguments that the plaintiff is a member of a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, or that the law interferes with a fundamental right, it will settle on rational
basis review and the plaintiff will lose. But if the Court is persuaded of either of these two
prerequisites, it will apply heightened scrutiny and likely strike the challenged law.”
(footnotes omitted)).
335

See Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 203, 204–05 (1996) (noticing the Supreme Court makes the distinction that sex
discrimination triggers intermediate scrutiny but race receives strict scrutiny).
336
Siegel, supra note 333, at 2344-45 (“Finally, and I would argue most importantly,
critics of tiered scrutiny have argued that the doctrine fails to adequately capture the
normative content of the Equal Protection Clause.” (footnote omitted)).
337

See Halley, supra note 325, at 567.

338

See generally Amar, supra note 335, at 203.

339

Id. at 224.

340

Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 892.
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“It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort. Central to both
the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal
protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open and
impartial to all who seek its assistance.”341 In Romer, animus-focused rationality
review allowed the Court to bypass the task of suspect classification of gays in a
trade-off that permitted the Court to reach more directly and readily for the focus on
what lies behind legislative discrimination that hindered “respect for other citizens’
freedom of association”342—in other words, a protectable commonality of
experience. Animus-focused jurisprudence can “embody a move to a more objective
approach to meaning, and thus one closer to social meaning”343 that brings about
common ground and makes this kind of review more functional for litigating
discrimination against sexual minorities in light of the difficulties of suspect
classification. For if Richard Posner is correct that “[s]exuality is the
multidisciplinary subject par excellence,”344 then a jurisprudence that stares directly
toward the invidiousness threatening the dignity of sexual minorities suggests a more
functional way of reparation than trying to explaining why sexual orientation, with
all of its complexities, should be afforded heightened scrutiny before applying that
review.
B. Windsor’s Appeal
In restricting DOMA from “diminishing the stability and predictability of basic
personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect”345—
another commonality of human experience—Windsor, as the latest incrementalist
step, had the ability to solidify animus-focused jurisprudence for sexual minorities
more effectively than its predecessor cases, Romer and Lawrence, and other recent
significant steps for LGBT equality, such as the DADT repeal. Windsor bodes much
for the development of animus-focused jurisprudence in gay rights litigation,
because in contrast to Romer and Lawrence, the 2013 decision had the least
encumbrance in applying such review. Windsor is both the last step federally in the
marriage equality incrementalism theorized by Eskridge, Merin, and Waaldijk, while
being a major Supreme Court case to review marriage equality using animus. The
confluence between incrementalism and marriage equality has brought about a case
that utilizes legislative animus to overcome sexual minority inequality in a more
prominent and unfettered way than other preceding moments.
With Romer, Pollvogt has mentioned in her study on animus that although the
1996 Supreme Court decision was the first in the line of cases to use animus-focused
rationality to specifically address discrimination against sexual minorities, Romer
also had to co-exist with Supreme Court precedent in Bowers.346 At the time, it was
debatable whether Romer overturned Bowers.347 And in light of that legal
341

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).

342

Id.

343

Blacklock, supra note 329, at 244.

344

RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 36 (1992).

345

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).

346

See Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 911.

347

Id.
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uncertainty until Lawrence, the reach of animus-focused jurisprudence in Romer had
to be reconciled with Bowers, or at least that precedent stood in more of a state of
limbo until Lawrence and now Windsor.348
Similarly, animus was part of Lawrence’s rationale in finding just how “wrong”
the Bowers decision was in validating anti-sodomy laws in 1986.349 Lawrence’s
doctrinal focus on animus was not an act culled from a vacuum, but had extended
from Romer’s influence.350 Although not distinctly an equal protection case, but
carrying with it some overtones of equality, Lawrence utilized animus in its due
process analysis to show how conduct—sodomy—was used to criminalize
consenting same-sex adults engaging in sex that could, but not always, indicate
sexual orientation.351 Pollvogt has noted that
the real focus of Lawrence was to reject differential treatment based on
sexual orientation. Lawrence addressed whether a state could criminalize
homosexual sodomy that took place in private between consenting adults.
There was no question that the animating spirit of the law was bare moral
disapproval of homosexual conduct and identity. The question was
whether such disapproval was a permissible basis for legislation. The
Court held that it was not.352
In a specific passage of Lawrence, Kennedy implicitly characterized that
disapproval behind anti-sodomy laws by calling into question much of Bowers’
historical recitation over how traditional and how fixed anti-sodomy laws stood for
singling out sexual minorities:
Despite the absence of prosecutions, there may have been periods in which there
was public criticism of homosexuals as such and an insistence that the criminal laws
be enforced to discourage their practices. But far from possessing ‘ancient roots,’
American laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the
20th century.353
Rather than approbation for gays, Kennedy relayed that such laws actually
represented efforts to curb non-procreative sex generally.354 Kennedy’s correction of
Bowers here would suggest that the moral approbation toward sexual minorities that
the Bowers majority had assembled falsely to justify anti-sodomy laws was, in fact, a
kind of irrational animus.
After finding such animus, Kennedy enquired “whether the majority may use the
power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of
the criminal law. ‘Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
348

See id. at 891.

349

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003) (finding that the Texas antisodomy law was based on animus in overruling Bowers).
350

Id. at 574 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)).

351

See Anthony Michael Kreis, Lawrence Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional Norms
with Sexual-Orientation Defamation, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 125, 137 (2012), http://
yalelawjournal.org/2012/11/12/kreis.html.
352

Pollvogt, supra note 317, at 921 (footnotes omitted).

353

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570 (citations omitted).

354

Id.
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own moral code.’ ”355 Kennedy saw that the animus behind the criminalization of
conduct that might be particularized against sexual minorities was both by a private
majority and veiled behind public laws.356 Without mentioning it, Kennedy seemed
to invoke an animus-focused reasoning to overturn Bowers because he found that the
purpose of denying commonality of human experience led to violating personal
dignity. He reached for that commonality explicitly in Lawrence through Romer and
posited that “Romer invalidated an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution which
named as a solitary class persons who were homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual either
by ‘orientation, conduct, practices or relationships,’ and deprived them of protection
under state antidiscrimination laws.”357 He articulated that specifically “[w]e
concluded that the provision [in Romer] was ‘born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected’ and further that it had no rational relation to a legitimate
governmental purpose.”358 Likewise then, in Lawrence, Kennedy similarly remarked
that anti-sodomy laws borne out of animosity toward sexual minorities “demeans the
lives of homosexual persons”359 and deprived rights that led to a loss of personal
dignity with universal application.360
However, Lawrence’s muted use of animus makes it hard to place it on par with
Windsor’s direct application of animus in an equal protection case. Even in its
muddled state between due process and equal protection, Lawrence has less direct
bearing as an alternative for classifying sexual minorities as suspect for heightened
scrutiny in equal protection.361 But the majority’s use of animus in a due process
case such as Lawrence does demonstrate the versatility of animus not only for laws
that discriminate based on traits but also for laws against conduct—as the difference
in analysis between an equal protection and a due process review in Lawrence
amounted to the difference between evaluating the anti-sodomy laws based on how it
regulated sodomy by identity (equal protection) or by conduct (due process).362
355

Id. at 571 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).

356

Id. at 569-70.

357

Id. at 574.

358

Id.

359

Id.

360

See id. at 578.

361

See generally id. at 562-79. Even though the majority opinion does recount one of the
issues on appeal as “[w]hether petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas ‘Homosexual
Conduct’ law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical
behavior by different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of the laws,” id. at 564, Lawrence’s resolution does not address equal protection or
suspect classification issues. In fact, Justice Kennedy alludes to the avoidance of equal
protection jurisprudence when he claims that the majority ruling Lawrence “does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.” Id. at 578.
362
See, e.g., id. (Justice Kennedy concurs with Justice Steven’s dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick, particularly with the passage that references animus in the way that “‘the fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,’” id. (citing Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), before Justice Kennedy
reiterates his resolution of Lawrence under due process by stating that Lawrence does not

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

63

64

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

Animus-focused jurisprudence would address discrimination of laws that burden
protectable conduct as a pretext to marginalizing a certain group. These were the
larger implications for animus existing nascent in Lawrence. Windsor, as an equal
protection case couched within Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, stands bookended
with Romer but it also builds on Lawrence’s use of animus to extend that notion of a
protected commonality. Citing Lawrence, Kennedy used protected consensual sexual
intimacy to establish “‘a personal bond that is more enduring.’”363 Kennedy moved
on to depict that bond as something that the state of New York was justified in
recognizing legalizing same-sex marriages,364 and that DOMA took this recognition
away based on moral disapproval.365
Windsor is also superior for the rearing of animus-focused jurisprudence than its
sister event of incrementalism, the repeal of DADT. For creating case law, the
congressional repeal lacked such direct opportunity. Additionally, the doctrinal
uncertainty after Lawrence did not successfully influence post-Lawrence, pre-DADT
repeal cases from uniformly applying animus-focused jurisprudence. Those cases
were scattered. Although Cook and Witt both distilled from Lawrence a higher
standard of review than traditional rationality, the cases were not able to apply
animus-focused jurisprudence effectively in the face of military deference.366 This
ceiling for animus is a shortcoming, but only so in the confines of litigation against
military deference—an exceptional situation outside the usual realms of civilian
American life and experience.367 Log Cabin Republicans later used a heightened
scrutiny to reach its conclusion that DADT was unconstitutional.368 Although Robert
involve status or “formal recognition of any relationship that homoosexual persons seek to
enter,” id., but rather conduct or “sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle,” id., that
the Due Process Clause protects).
363

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at

567).
364

Id. at 2693.

365

Id. “The House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval of
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.’” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-664 at 16). “The
differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution
protects.” Id. (citing generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558).
366

Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding that “Lawrence is, in our view,
another in this line of Supreme Court authority that identifies a protected liberty interest and
then applies a standard of review that lies between strict scrutiny and rational basis” before
applying it to plaintiff’s facial constitutional challenges to DADT); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air
Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did
in Lawrence with the minimal protections afforded by traditional rational basis review.”).
367

See Ellen Oberwetter, Rethinking Military Deference: Male-Only Draft Registration
and the Intersection of Military Need with Civilian Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 173, 181 (1999)
(“The varying rationales for upholding Congress's authority to implement military policies in
tension with constitutional rights include the arguments that (1) Congress's military authority
is plenary and not subject to review, (2) the Court lacks the competence to review complex
military matters, and (3) the military is a separate society, the regulation of which is without
analogy in the civilian sector.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
368

Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 911 (C.D. Cal 2010),
vacated, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Correales believes that DADT litigants can now theoretically rely on animus-focused
jurisprudence in cases seeking remedial reparation for harm suffered as a result of
DADT discrimination,369 at the time before the repeal, his thoughts on animusfocused jurisprudence remained much more theoretical as Lawrence’s use of animus
successfully addressed the decriminalization of consensual same-sex intimacy was
conversely difficult for courts to interpret and apply.
Henceforth, the arrival of Windsor as yet another gay rights case applying
animus-focused, rationality review but this time as the last step within marriage
equality incrementalism rears this jurisprudence for sexual minorities from infancy
to pre-adolescence. First, as marriage equality cases have proceeded in lower state
and federal courts in the interim between Lawrence and Windsor, several notable
lower court decisions that have applied animus-focused jurisprudence successfully
for legal recognition of marriage to same-sex couples, setting the stage for Supreme
Court weigh-in.370 Most prominently a few challenges to Section 3 of DOMA in
federal courts viewed the definition unconstitutional under rationality approach,371
but also other cases challenging traditional marriages such as Goodridge relied on
rationality and so did Perry v. Schwartzenegger.372 In fact, it could be that the
Supreme Court’s use of animus and rational basis review will exist quite definitively
in the marriage equality arena for some time, as the adopted standard could clarify
challenges in state and federal courts. Certainly, a status that officially triggers
heightened scrutiny would be ideal because of its traditional protections.
Nevertheless, in that possible interim toward suspect or quasi-suspect, an enhanced
rational basis review with its teeth on animus could suffice.
Windsor also harnessed animus-focused jurisprudence in an era much less
antagonistic toward sexual minorities. Unlike Lawrence and Romer, the Supreme
Court applied animus-focused jurisprudence in a more favorable social climate for
sexual minorities.373 Part of this transformation is marriage equality incrementalism;
the necessary steps have begun to draw favor upon sexual minorities gradually, with
each ascending moment adding upon the next. But it has partly also been attributed
to the visibility of sexual minorities in present culture and also the changing public
attitudes toward LGBT rights—particularly with younger constituencies.374 The
369
See Robert I. Correales, Unfinished Business: A Discussion of Remedies for Victims of
Involuntary Dismissal Under Don't Ask, Don’t Tell and Its Predecessor, Toward A True
Reconciliation, 22 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 22 (2012) (referencing Robert I. Correales,
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: A Dying Policy, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 413, 415 (2008)).
370
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st
Cir. 2012); Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 335-40 (D. Conn.
2012); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 872 F. Supp. 2d 944, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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positioning of animus-focused jurisprudence in Windsor amidst the backdrop of
rising social approval might prove interesting contrast for spotlighting that much
more dramatically and effectively the historical hatred and moral disapproval toward
sexual minorities.
And third, through animus-focused enquiry, Windsor, reinforced the significant
rights dealing with commonalities of human experience that were set up earlier in
Romer and Lawrence, creating a more concrete case law in this area. Like Romer,
Windsor bypassed suspect classification by reaching toward animus to spot the
irrational deprivation of equal protection of laws against sexual minorities.375 Romer
found that “[r]espect for this principle explains why laws singling out a certain class
of citizens for disfavored legal state or general hardships are rare”376 and that “laws
of this kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affect.”377 Windsor copied
this review by finding that “DOMA’s principal effect is to identify a subset of statesanctioned marriages and make them unequal”378 and that the basis for this is the
animus when “[t]he House concluded that DOMA expresses ‘both moral disapproval
of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with
traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”379 It also reaffirmed a bit of the
mystery in litigating and reaching the finding of animus as Windsor relied on
Romer’s technique of inferring animus from Colorado’s Amendment 2: “In
determining whether a law is motivated by an improper animus or purpose,
‘“‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’”’ especially require careful
consideration.”380 Romer started with these unusual discriminations in Amendment
2—that deprived sexual minorities legal protection in Colorado—and found it
created the irrationality that up-ended Amendment 2 constitutionally.381 According
to Pollvogt, this type of inference is both different from the enquiry used in Cleburne
and was a product of Romer’s muted reconciliation with Bowers’ existence at the
time.382 Cleburne used, what Pollovogt described, as inferring animus from
examining “the structure of the law” in question and seeking whether there was a
“logical connection” between the trait that those arguing discrimination inhabited
and any governmental interest in that legislation.”383 Romer, conversely, found that
“Amendment 2 must be based in animus because there was a radical lack of fit
between the laws means and ends.”384 Interestingly, the easiest way to infer animus
375

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
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Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
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would be to look textually at “the direct evidence of private bias as the impetus
behind adopting a law”385 which include “[s]uch statements may be made by
legislators or private individuals and may express any number of sentiments that
shed light on the true function of the law: a mere recognition of the existence of
private bias; an expression of bare moral disapproval; and/or statements of stereotype
or fear.”386 This method would have been most readily available based on the ample
legislative record. But Kennedy decided to save that as his second line of enquiry, as
if nearing the means and ends analysis of the Section 3 through its discrimination
toward same-sex couples would substantiate the more textual analysis behind
DOMA. He proceeded first by making that means and ends inference of animus:
DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing and
accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex
couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal
recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of a law having the
purpose and effect of disapproval of that class. The avowed purpose and
practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a
separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex
marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.387
Only after this enquiry, did Kennedy then draw animus separately from looking
at how “[t]he history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that
interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages”388 and examine the House
report for moral disapproval.389 Kennedy’s arrangement here highlights this more
liberal method of inferring animus based on discriminations of unusual character
posed against unifying constitutional principles of equal protection rather than
Cleburne’s method which focuses the investigation back onto classifications.
But Windsor’s adoption of Romer for inferring animus gets us only half-way. We
must also examine how its application reaches a focus on commonality rather than
distinctions that reflect social and cultural pluralism. The finding of animus is
inversely connected with deprivations that lead to violating human dignity, and this
is where Lawrence enters, as both Windsor and Lawrence are Supreme Court
decisions heavily framed in dignity rights.390 By finding that anti-sodomy laws
violated some kind of protectable privacy right, Kennedy’s majority opinion in
Lawrence then draws the link between violation of privacy to infringement of human
dignity.391 Bowers and its validation of anti-sodomy laws “as precedent demeans the
385

Id. (footnotes omitted).
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See id.; accord Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (“The central holding
of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it should be addressed. Its
continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”).
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Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which
does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is
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lives of homosexual persons.”392 Beyond the misdemeanor triggered by violating the
statute in Texas,393 the stigma of the statute resonates toward an encroachment upon
what Kennedy believed the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution afforded.394
According to Glensy, Lawrence could have “focus[ed] on a possibly narrower ruling
by linking the violation to an intrusion on one's privacy,”395 but instead the majority
“opted for a broader statement, by declaring that the accused statute infringed upon a
liberty interest that involved ‘the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,’ which are key
to the protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.”396 Kennedy was not
ready to just let go of the opinion on narrower grounds but connected the criminal
stigma of the Texas anti-sodomy law to an “offense with all that imports of the
dignity of the persons charged.”397 A decade later, it helped that Kennedy penned the
Windsor majority because it seems as if with DOMA, he picked up where he had
figuratively left off in Lawrence. Again, with the rights of sexual minorities,
Kennedy has moved toward a jurisprudence that seemingly shifts away from the
categories that outline traditional tiered-scrutiny, and with the help of inferring
animus, he magnified the inequality of Section 3 to common, but universal
conditions. He did this by again, as in Lawrence, calling out that the result of
DOMA, like the Texas sodomy statute, “demeans the couple, whose moral and
sexual choices the Constitution protects [citing Lawrence] and whose relationship
the State has sought to dignify.”398 From this vantage point, the difference is subtle
as DOMA was decided partially on federalism grounds and Kennedy couched the
infringement caused as an unconstitutional interference upon the right of New York
“to acknowledge a status the State finds to dignified and proper[.]”399 Windsor, like
Lawrence, are cases where the majority facilitated the links between the experiences
of sexual orientation to commonalities of human experience by inversely targeting
the animus lurking with the law and blocking full access to that commonality and
distorted personal dignity. From there, we arrive at uncovering discrimination
without singling out sexual minorities for qualifying under tiered scrutiny.400 This
developing jurisprudence bears potential for sexual minorities federally.

made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”).
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C. Stepping Forth from Windsor’s Shortcomings
As far as full gratification is concerned, however, Windsor is also decidedly
deceptive. Alas, so far the conceit of Part IV has been to highlight the dynamic
potential in Windsor’s furtherance of animus-focused jurisprudence. But there are
serious boundaries that limit Windsor’s step toward a fuller sense of common ground
and equality for sexual minorities, leaving Windsor’s doctrinal reach with animusjurisprudence this time not as far as it could have been.
In Windsor, the Court did seem to endorse that abandonment of antigay
essentialism as its interpretation of the House report and its finding upon the reasons
behind DOMA—in particular, disapproval of gays—echoed that of Lawrence and
Romer. But the inverse is not as bold. The focus on the bond of marriage, rather than
biology, did not appear as personally tied to the Court when one places Windsor’s
recognition of same-sex marriage in a tautology encased in the federalism aspects of
the case—that DOMA intruded upon New York state’s regulation of marriage within
its borders and upon the equal protection that the Fifth Amendment has been
interpreted to hold.401 Windsor, in its broadest sense with DOMA, is about
congressional intrusion into state sovereignty. So in order to find that New York
State’s ability to regulate marriage was violated by federal law, the Court had to
rationalize how that occurred by drawing up New York’s recognition of same-sex
marriage, which seemed to resonate with a broader sense of marriage than what
DOMA had essentialized in 1996.402 It appears then that the Court’s recognition of
same-sex relationships in marriage was ultimately through the lens of New York law
and through not its own.
In overturning DOMA based on federalism principles, the Windsor Court
condoned the prerogatives of the state—any state in fact—that would have done
what New York did, which was to recognize the bond and commonalities of
experience that same-sex couples deserved within the legal protections of stateregulated marriage, and that the antigay essentialism that Congress harnessed to draft
and pass DOMA was the animus that resulted in Section 3’s inference with New
York’s prerogatives—thus, making Section 3 irrational.403 The Court stood behind
federalism and the Fifth Amendment to make that positive assessment of same-sex
marriage and commonality, of bond over biology. And likely, as Chief Justice
Roberts’ dissent contended, Windsor would also honor a state’s refusal to recognize
same-sex couples in marriage.404 Although animus-jurisprudence has the ability to
spotlight commonalities of human experience as it feeds into a more robust and
modern view of marriage, the Court did not use it directly to express its own views
of marriage in Windsor, rather the majority expressed justification for New York
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Id. at 2692.
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Id. at 2695 (“What has been explained to this point should more than suffice to establish
that the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons
who are in a lawful same-sex marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that
DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution.”).
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State to construct marriage the way it does without federal intervention.405 If this was
an endorsement of same-sex marriage, it was a subtle one.
Perhaps this is incrementalism at play here—small steps again. With all the
potential that could be harnessed by animus-focused jurisprudence, the law
maintains gradual baby steps toward that goal. If that is the case and if the
underlying normative response is that sexual identity is important enough for
constitutional legal protection and recognition, then the question regards how the law
should retain and recapitulate animus-focused jurisprudence for that purpose going
forth. In the immediate aftermath of Windsor, two areas unresolved by the opinion,
more or less on state levels, might help strengthen animus-jurisprudence for fully
recognizing marriage equality and issues surrounding sexual orientation in the
future.
First, even if the Court was shielded behind the Fifth Amendment in Windsor, its
use of animus-focused jurisprudence has unleashed a rudimentary blueprint for
sexual minorities with desire to combat the 36 mini-DOMAs that exist across the
states defining marriage as different-sex.406 To extend this idea, where
constitutionally permitted, litigants should use animus-focused rationality and
emulate, from Windsor’s lead, similar types of antigay essentialism that reveal biases
toward a group that could deem a discriminatory law irrational. Although Roberts in
his dissent in Windsor believed that “those statute-specific considerations [of animus
in DOMA] will, of course, be irrelevant in future cases about different statutes,”407
future cases should rely on Windsor, at least, for a path for finding animus perhaps in
other state-enacted DOMAs. Justice Scalia’s strikingly reactive tone toward the
majority’s opinion seemed to reflect a less tempered view than Roberts’. Both
Justices vary in their degrees of urgency toward the majority’s delineation of New
York’s marriage laws—favorable to same-sex couples—in overturning DOMA.
Roberts tried emphatically to remind the public that Windsor was ruled on the
narrower grounds of federalism,408 while Scalia attempted with several examples to
illustrate “[h]ow easy, indeed how inevitable, to reach the [majority’s] same
conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status.”409
With Lawrence, Scalia’s dissenting forecast that decriminalized sodomy would lead
to aid expansion of marriage for same-sex couples was realized in Windsor.410 Adam
Liptak has characterized it as “Justice Scalia’s sky-is-falling approach,”411 and
405

See e.g., id. at 2692 (“[T]he States decision to give this class of persons the right to
marry, conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. When the State used its
historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its power
in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their
own community. DOMA, because of its reach and extent, departs from this history and
tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage.”).
406
See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATE MARRIAGE LAWS AND BANS (2012), available at
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/StateMarriageLaws_Bans.pdf.
407

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

408

Id.

409

Id.

410

Id.

411
ADAM LIPTAK, TO HAVE AND UPHOLD: THE SUPREME COURT
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (Kindle ed. 2013).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/4

AND THE

BATTLE

FOR

70

2014]

WEATHER PERMITTING

71

similarly here, Scalia might be correct in sensing that a Windsor strategy bears
potential here for a gathering litigation storm over mini-DOMA’s, while Roberts’
downplaying might be a strategy in it of itself of acknowledging the same. The
animus-focused jurisprudence in Windsor could help lead those charges on the state
level.
This potential testing of animus-focused jurisprudence would veritably utilize
patchwork incrementalism to fulfill a strengthening of the doctrine. If state litigants
do progress down this path, then it would be wise to stick to using Windsor and
Romer-type enquiry, but also add to the doctrine by what Pollvogt found in Cleburne
was a focus on the structure of the discriminatory law to infer animus.412 The focus
would be, again, urged upon discrimination—inferring animus through perhaps other
examples of antigay essentialism or otherwise—building out this particular doctrine
in the realm of sexual orientation. In addition, the focus on animus should also
uncover infringement of normatively-protected commonalities of human experiences
as well to weaken a federalism approach from Windsor that states might use to
uphold refusal to recognize same-sex marriage. This connection might be guided
particularly by Lawrence and Windsor’s venture into dignity and the rights, as
couched by Kennedy, that follow accordingly from the Constitution. As a strategy,
this focus would also oppose the “stabilizing prudence” arguments that Scalia tries to
reinforce as a way to de-emphasize any sort of legislative animus,413 and instead ease
into inferring animus more readily. An example from Windsor would be how
DOMA’s federal exclusion of marriage shamed not only married same-sex couples
in New York but also their children.414
Secondly, the other litigation where animus-focused jurisprudence might arise is
within Section 2 of DOMA—an issue that Scalia conspicuously raises was amiss in
Windsor415—which allow states to not recognize same-sex marriages from other
states. According to Steve Sanders,
like DOMA’s Section 3, the discrimination legitimized by Section 2 and
practiced by the majority of states is of an ‘unusual character.’ All states
currently recognize the vast majority of marriages celebrated in other
states, not as a constitutional requirement (the conventional wisdom is
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause doesn’t apply here) but as a matter of
comity and common sense. Accordingly individual states have long
recognized marriages—common-law, first-cousin, even uncle-niece—that
they themselves would not have created.416
If litigants do not press for equal recognition, this continued practice of Section 2
would again segregate different-sex and same-sex marriages for disproportionate
significance, leading to a lowered status in the eyes of the law if same-sex marriages
412
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that are valid in one state are not so in another. Litigants could rely on animusfocused jurisprudence in future Supreme Court confrontations—especially if
litigants can characterize, as Sanders does, the discrimination in Section 2 as that of
an “unusual character,” which for Kennedy in both Windsor and Romer trigger
reliance on enhanced rationality review.417
With opportunity, distinct determination, and careful litigation, animus-focused
jurisprudence, if strengthened, could have an effective longevity for equality rights
in the sexual orientation arena. Although muted in application by the Fifth
Amendment, Windsor affords a sketch of the further possibilities of this type of
doctrine forged from previous gay rights cases at the Supreme Court. Windsor’s use
of animus-focused jurisprudence creates an important endorsement of this type of
review because further implications and possibilities could lie in the rearing of
animus-focused jurisprudence into substantial doctrinal maturity with more
discriminatory issues litigated thusly. In drawing this Article’s normative response to
Windsor to an end, three larger future end-result possibilities could be fulfilled by
animus-focused jurisprudence that warrants its positive legal development. First,
animus-focused jurisprudence could be subsumed into traditional tiered scrutiny by
affirming notions of a sliding scale approach to tiered scrutiny that have been
advocated by previous Supreme Court cases.418 Perhaps doing so might have
potential to create heightened review especially for sexual orientation discrimination
cases. Although narrow, this result would be desirable as an alternative to quasisuspect or suspect classifications without the trappings of officially proving them up.
This result would reflect again the functionality of animus-focused jurisprudence.
But the danger here is that what is not officially a suspect class may never be
accorded similar regard. So even more appropriately as a second possibility, animusfocused jurisprudence might finally allow articulation of sexual orientation to
become a quasi-suspect or suspect classification in traditional tiered scrutiny itself.
An abundance of enhanced rationality review cases for sexual orientation
discrimination in the future might assert a call for clarity or revisiting of
classifications that officially trigger heightened scrutiny, instead of having a
“putative” classification reserved for sexual orientation. This result would bring
consistency—though it would be consistency in a system of review profoundly
unsuited against present-world expectations of pluralism.
And thirdly, stretching that sentiment regarding tiered scrutiny further, animusfocused jurisprudence could reform tiered scrutiny in the long run, if such cases in
the aggregate reveal the rigidity of a more formalist tiered scrutiny within an age
where the discourse on identity politics in fields outside of law seem distant to the
review the Supreme Court has relied on since the middle of the last century over the
same subject matter. The current era is embracing a more postmodern sensibility of
identity with an approach toward cultural distinction and pluralism that does not
necessarily comport with the existing legal framework created after the era of U.S. v.
Carolene Products, Co.419 and the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s.
417

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).

418

See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
419

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss1/4

72

2014]

WEATHER PERMITTING

73

As examined above, some have argued this shift has awakened cultural sensitivities
more profoundly and relegated the venerable but entrenched approach to equal
protection jurisprudence into an anachronistic quandary. With this result, where
animus-focused jurisprudence might eventually take equality rights cases into a
realm previously unseen, the dynamics are less predictively defined for now. Likely,
it would, again, take steps, but the promise of making discrimination and bias against
a particular group more vividly in the law, and examining its invidiousness toward
commonalities of experience and dignity, in order to eradicate its propensity, should
be stressed continually.
V. CONCLUSION
The NOM video was absolutely correct to proclaim that something in the debate
exists far beyond marriage equality advocacy. Its approach, however, was wrong.
With Windsor, the marriage of incrementalism and sexual orientation jurisprudence
has reared the development of an alternative line of review for discrimination based
on the animus, and not on traits that may or may not render recipients of
discrimination any favorable scrutiny. This development of animus-focused
jurisprudence for identity—starting with sexual identity—should figure in the next
steps forth in the incrementalism that has brought about the federal recognition of
married same-sex couples. As we have seen, this development itself—although
favorable so far for sexual minorities—is larger and bigger than same-sex marriage.
Animus-focused jurisprudence could, if carefully harnessed going forth for future
litigation over sexuality, transform the discourse and doctrine covering identity
politics in the climate of American legal consciousness.
With this positive advance then, how can any thoughts turn to stormy weather?
Where is the tempest that is gathering? Where did it go? The storm clouds seem to
have dissipated; the lightning ceased. And the voices that underlined NOM’s
message appear much less relevant.
Likewise, is the sky as lucid, with the sun so illuminating that the only problem
that seems pertinent is a glare on an electronic tablet? No. No beaches stand before
us, not just yet, and no celebratory drinks are being poured from the bar—just the
idea of common ground made more vividly by Windsor, incrementalism, animusfocused jurisprudence, and hopefully the future that stems from all of this.
As far as their rights are concerned, sexual minorities are no longer enduring that
storm of historical persecution, but are somewhere in between downpour and clarity.
It is possible that they may never reach that beach, to really sit on those lounge
chairs and have full freedom to enjoy personal dignity and autonomy. But that is not
what the beach in the Amazon commercial really signifies. Instead, that beach is an
aspiration, a good mirage of sorts, a kind of idealistic paradise in which the closer we
approach, the further off it remains as an eidos of sexual identity politics. Our
recognition of that goal is favorable; our steps to reaching that goal are even more
laudable. The motion that propels us closer inch-by-inch covers exudes significance
and takes us far beyond same-sex marriage.
With the steps accomplished so far on this incremental journey, the march to
marriage equality has finally brought forth an examination of personal dignity and
commonality that concerned the expressive regulations of sexual minorities; each
shift away from regulations restricting identity expression throughout the
incrementalist journey federally has been a moment where antigay essentialism was
abandoned, and in its place the law moved steps closer to the center of enquiry
where, as far as gay rights is concerned, that essentialism is being eviscerated by
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animus-focused jurisprudence that poses significance in constitutional jurisprudence.
The federal government now leaves same-sex marriages alone. The law is beginning
to expose the traditional animus that has oppressed sexual minorities. These
developments have come a long way, and they must unfold positively for the
expression of sexual identities. Though the question will always seek what the next
development is, there are two things for certain: first, progress will be incremental;
and secondly, the implications, of course, will be huge.
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